Thurgood Marshall

“ The Court today holds that the Fourth Amendment permits a routine police inventory search of the closed [p385] glove compartment of a locked automobile impounded for ordinary traffic violations. Under the Court's holding, such a search may be made without attempting to secure the consent of the owner and without any particular reason to believe the impounded automobile contains contraband, evidence, or valuables, or presents any danger to its custodians or the public. ”

“ Even if it may be true that many persons would ordinarily consent to a protective inventory of their car upon its impoundment, this fact is not dispositive since even a majority lacks authority to consent to the search of all cars in order to assure the search of theirs. ”

“ In my view, the Constitution does not permit such searches as a matter of routine; absent specific consent, such a search is permissible only in exceptional circumstances of particular necessity.
It is at least clear that any owner might prohibit the police from executing a protective search of his impounded car, since, by hypothesis, the inventory is conducted for the owner's benefit. Moreover, it is obvious that not everyone whose car is impounded would want it to be searched. Respondent himself proves this ”

“ There is no suggestion that the police suspected that respondent's car was stolen, or that their search was directed at, or stopped with, a determination of the car's ownership. Indeed, although the police readily identified the car as respondent's, Record 98-99, the record does not show that they ever sought to contact him.
↑ . The very premise of the State's chief argument, that the cars must be searched in order to protect valuables because no guard is posted around the vehicles, itself belies the argument that they must be searched at the city lot in order to protect the police there. ”

“ Thus, while the safety rationale may not be entirely discounted when it is actually relied upon, it surely cannot justify the search of every car upon the basis of undifferentiated possibility of harm ”

“ Nor does this case concern intrusions of the scope that the Court apparently assumes would ordinarily be permissible in order to insure the running safety of a car. While it may be that privacy expectations associated with automobile travel are in some regards less than those associated with a home or office, see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, post at 561-52, it is equally clear that " [t] he word ‘automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away . ”

“ State v. McDougal, 68 Wis.2d 399, 228 N.W.2d 671 (1975) ; Mozzetti v. Superior Court, supra. But this limitation does not remedy the Fourth Amendment intrusion when the simple inventorying of closed areas discloses tokens, literature, medicines, or other things which on their face may "reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs," California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78-79 (1974) (POWELL, J., concurring) .
↑ . The Court also observes that, " [i] n addition, police frequently attempt to determine whether a vehicle has been stolen and thereafter abandoned." ”

“ I agree with MR. JUSTICE POWELL's conclusion, ante at 377 n. 1, that, as petitioner conceded, Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, the examination of the closed glove compartment in this case is a "search." See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) :
It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior. See also Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967) , quoted in n. 5, infra. Indeed, the Court recognized in Harris v. ”

“ Ortiz, supra; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269-270 (1973) ; Coolidge, supra; Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221-222 (1968) ; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) . ”