United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit

“ A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered to a foreign state unless provision is made by the law of that state, or by arrangement that the fugitive criminal shall not, until he has been restored or had an opportunity of returning to Her Majesty's dominions, be detained or tried in that foreign state for any offence committed prior to his surrender other than the extradition crime proved by the facts on which the surrender is grounded. ”

“ They make no claim *455 **5 of inconvenience to them; on the other hand, had the case been dismissed by the District Court the government would have suffered great inconvenience, for dismissal would have required a new indictment in Superior Court and new extradition proceedings. A new beginning would not have promoted judicial economy; when the motion to divest jurisdiction was made, the District Court had already invested substantial time in the case. The argument that retention of jurisdiction was unfair to the defendants is likewise untenable. ”

“ In that case Flores was extradited to the United States for trial on conspiracy charges "expressly limited with respect to time to the acts committed between September 3, 1970 and April 30, 1971, excluding any previous or subsequent acts." Id. at 941. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that although prosecution for earlier offenses was barred, evidence of such offenses might be introduced to establish the crimes for which Flores was tried. In other words, "the normal procedural and evidentiary rules of our domestic courts continue to control Flores' prosecution." Id. ”

“ It is convenient at once to state that that section is complementary to section 3 (2) of the Act which is dealing with the case of a fugitive criminal, that is the foreigner, when he is surrendered by this country to the foreign state, ...
The argument for the applicant is put very concisely ... in this form: that the person concerned who is surrendered to this country cannot be committed and put in peril of conviction on any facts other than those put forward to secure his surrender. ”

“ Kember and Budlong argue that the United States Attorneys Office had a disqualifying emotional interest in the outcome of the case because it was the "victim" of one of the crimes alleged in the indictment. In addition, they contend that two of the prosecutors were disqualified because they were defendants in a civil action filed by Scientology ten days after the search of the Scientology offices in Los Angeles. This suit alleged that the search was conducted in bad faith, with the intention of violating Scientology's constitutional rights. Our opinion in United States v. ”

“ Because they were extradited for trial and *454 **4 were tried for only the local burglary offenses Kember and Budlong say they should have been tried in the District of Columbia Superior Court. They argue that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to divest itself of jurisdiction. We do not agree. ”

“ United States v. Kember, 208 U.S.App.D.C. 380, 384, 648 F.2d 1354, 1358 n.3, 1359 (1980) (Per Curiam) ; Goode v. Markley, 195 U.S.App.D.C. 391, 394, 603 F.2d 973, 976 (1979) , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1083, 100 S.Ct. 1039, 62 L.Ed.2d 768 (1980) . See also United States v. Cella, 37 App.D.C. 423 (1911) , cert. ”