Sandra Day O'Connor

“ The circumstance of breaking and entering the house is common and essential to both the species of this offence; but it does not of itself constitute the crime in either of them; for it is necessary, to the completion of burglary, that there should not only be a breaking and entering, but the breaking and entering must be accompanied with a felony actually committed or intended to be committed; and these two offences are so distinct in their nature, that evidence of one of them will not support an indictment for the other. ”

“ A court can always determine, before trial, whether the second prosecution involves the "same offence" in the Blockburger sense, since the Constitution entitles the defendant "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." ”

“ The English practice, as understood in 1791, did not recognize auterfoits acquit and auterfoits convict as good pleas against successive prosecutions for crimes whose elements were distinct, even though based on the same act. An acquittal or conviction for larceny, for example, did not bar a trial for trespass based on "the same taking, because Trespass and Larceny are Offences of a different Nature, and the Judgment for the one entirely differs from that for the other." ”

“ We reversed the lower court's determination that the second prosecution was barred by the Blockburger test, because each statute had a statutory element that the other did not: Manslaughter, but not failure to reduce speed, required proof of death; failure to reduce speed, but not manslaughter, required a failure to slow down. ”

“ Just as, in today's case, proof of drunken driving or of crossing the median strip invalidates the second prosecution even though they are not elements of the homicide and assault offenses of which respondent is charged; so also, in the hypotheticals given, proof of the substantive offense will invalidate the conspiracy prosecution and proof of the burglary the murder prosecution. ”

“ Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980) , in which a motorist who caused a fatal accident was first convicted of unlawful failure to reduce speed, and later charged with involuntary manslaughter. ”

“ The elements of the offenses covered by the subsequent charges whose dismissal is challenged here #fn-s [1] are, respectively, recklessly causing the death of another person, N.Y. Penal Law § 125.15 (McKinney 1987) , negligently causing the death of another person, § 125.10, and recklessly causing physical injury to another person, § 120.00. ”