United States Department of Justice

“ Ultimately, the most useful information came from those experts (both inside and outside the FBI) from whom the FBI solicited information. These experts supplied a wide range of information about Koresh's state of mind and behavior, and provided input on some of the most important issues the FBI faced. For example, many of the experts agreed that the possibility of mass suicide existed, but no consensus emerged about the likelihood of suicide. [1] Significantly, all the experts agreed that Koresh would not leave the compound voluntarily. ”

“ Koresh fully
understood this aspect of his personality, because he had boasted openly to the negotiators about his manipulative skills, including his manipulation of ATF undercover agent Rodriguez. Dietz emphasized that Koresh would use "any ruse, pretext, trick, deception or force necessary to achieve his personal goals." The most notable example of this manipulation was when Koresh did not leave the compound on March 2. As Dietz stated: " [T] he experience of hearing the voice of God tell him to wait should be seen as a self-serving excuse for not keeping his promise." ”

“ In their memorandum of March 8, 1993, Smerick and Young analyzed the relationship between Koresh and his followers, and the relationship between Koresh and law enforcement. Smerick and Young explained that Koresh's followers were fanatically devoted to him, and that they would not hesitate to kill themselves if Koresh told them to. "Koresh realizes that in an environment outside of the compound, without his control over the followers, he would lose his status as the Messiah, thus a mass suicide ordered by Koresh cannot be discounted. ”

“ On the other hand, the FBI received an unsolicited letter from the Harvard Negotiation Project containing thoughtful and specific suggestions to assist the negotiators in formulating a framework for further negotiations with Koresh.
A smaller number of offers came from individuals lacking a firm grip on reality, such as people claiming to be God or Jesus offering to "order" Koresh to leave the compound. One person was arrested on his way to the compound brandishing a samurai sword, which he said God had told him to deliver to Koresh. ”

“ Smerick also sat in and listened to the early negotiations with Koresh, and he discussed ideas with his colleagues at Quantico before putting them in writing. He wrote the memos because he was concerned that the FBI commanders were moving too rapidly toward a tactical solution, and were not allowing adequate time for negotiations to work. Smerick notes that the FBI commanders were action-oriented; they wanted to treat Koresh not as a negotiation partner, but rather as a "psychotic criminal" who needed to be caught and punished. ”

“ For example, Koresh's speech did not reflect any thought disorder. Koresh's speech, rhythm and tone were normal, and he was able to maintain a thought and express it in a direct, logical and goal-oriented manner. Koresh did not appear to be distracted by hallucinations. He responded directly to comments made to him, and did not appear to be distracted or responsive to imaginary stimuli. Although his movements were restricted due to the gunshot wounds he had sustained on February 28, he did not exhibit any movement disorders associated with psychosis. ”

“ During the next few weeks the FBI's Behavioral Sciences Unit at Quantico contacted Dietz occasionally to seek his advice about the progress of the negotiations. On March 11, Behavioral Sciences told Dietz that Koresh had refused to speak to the negotiators for two days. Dietz could not provide any explanation for the impasse. On March 25 and 30 1993, Behavioral Sciences updated Dietz on continuing problems in the progress of negotiations. Dietz suggested that the negotiators' strategy may have been inconsistent with other FBI actions, and that more frequent strategy meetings were needed. ”

“ For example, some of the experts believed that Koresh was psychotic, while others believed he was not. The FBI considered all the information it received and made the best judgment it could considering how such information could best be used to further the FBI's goals of achieving a peaceful end to the standoff with no loss of life. ”

“ First, Dietz predicted that Koresh would not come and would not surrender anyone of value to him unless and until he could be assured that his personal goals would be better fulfilled by surrender than by the alternatives. Dietz described Koresh's known goals as (1) power, control, and domination of as many other people as possible, especially people who offer him sex, money, and skills to exploit ”

“ E. "Cult Experts" The FBI did not solicit advice from any "cult experts" or "cult deprogrammers." The FBI did receive a number of unsolicited offers of assistance from former Branch Davidian member Marc Breault (who has since published a paperback book about Koresh and the Branch Davidians) . The FBI also received input from two self-described cult experts, Rick Ross (who moved to a hotel in Dallas, and later to Waco, during the standoff and appeared on local television programs, as well as the CNN broadcast of March 10 that upset Dr. Dietz) and Kelli Waxman. ”

“ Bell noted that these symptoms would make it difficult to achieve continuity and stability in the negotiation process. Dr. Bell also cautioned that it would be very dangerous for a person suffering from seizure disorders to have access to weapons. ”

“ The interviews also revealed a siege mentality within the compound; residents felt safe only inside the compound, perceiving a constant threat from "enemies" on the outside.
Dr. Perry also noted that the children lacked formal schooling, that they had been raised in primitive sanitary conditions (many of the children were fascinated at having seen flushing toilets for the first time following their release) , and that they had been subjected to strict physical discipline inside, the compound.
With respect to the Branch Davidians' religious beliefs, Dr. ”

“ Koresh's profound fear of prison; and (5) Koresh's strong inclination to choose death over losing power. Dietz concluded that the only two things the government could offer Koresh were more wives and more followers if he surrendered.
On the following morning, March 3, Dietz met with FBI SSA Pete Smerick to discuss various negotiation strategies. Dietz and Smerick prepared a memorandum recommending the adoption of two overall negotiation themes: First, the negotiators should acknowledge part of Koresh's world view ”