United States District Court, District of Columbia.

“ Defendants argue that plaintiff's history of mental health treatment and seven week hospitalization ought to establish that she knew or should have known of her injury more than three years before the filing of her complaint. The Court finds this argument conclusory. The Court is aware of the rule that an objective standard is employed under the discovery rule to determine when a "reasonable person" with plaintiff's factual knowledge knew or should have known of the possible injury. ”

“ Furthermore, Lifespring's stationery states that it is " [a] program ... leading toward a more fulfilled individual and a more harmonious world." The "program" offered does not appear to be aimed at fulfillment in terms of physical conditioning or intellectual training. To the contrary, Lifespring offers a product which appears to be geared primarily to the psychological. The Court will not insist that Lifespring hang up a shingle saying "psychologist" in order to find, for purposes of this motion, that they hold themselves out as having psychological expertise. ”

“ Plaintiff contends that the "training" is so like group therapy that the defendants should be held to reasonable standards applicable to mental health professionals, and has adduced evidence (in the shape of internal Lifespring memoranda) that prior to plaintiff's participation, the defendants were on notice that their business had psychological effects and presented a risk of harm to certain individuals. ”

“ Third, defendants argue that their allegedly abusive conduct as described in paragraph 16 of the complaint makes it clear that plaintiff was aware of wrongful conduct by defendants in 1979 and '80. The Court recalls, however, that in Bussineau it was held that the discovery rule is intended to apply to cases where the injury and its "cause in fact" do not themselves provide evidence of negligence, and that " [t] his is particularly so when the professional reassures the lay client or patient that all is well and that things are proceeding as they should." ”

“ McConkey, 524 A.2d 722, 727 (D.C.1987) , licensure is not the dispositive question in deciding whether defendants may be held to a "professional" standard of care. See, e.g., Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192 (D.C.1984) . Plaintiff has admitted to knowing before taking Lifespring "courses" that the *17 staff "are not licensed psychiatrists or psychologists," but the Court finds that D.C. case law does not hold that an unlicensed purveyor of "professional" psychological services should be afforded greater protection from claims of negligence or malpractice than a licensed one. ”

“ A.H. Robins Co., 613 F.Supp. 994, 996 (D.D.C.1985) . But the fact that an individual develops psychological problems, even severe ones, is not sufficient in itself to put a reasonable person on notice that they have been injured. ”