Summary

Wiley Blount Rutledge Fondren v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue…

So far as the argument turns on the motive of the donors, it may be answered that the statute and the regulation make no such test. If motive has bearing, it is only by reason of its effect upon the element of time and whatever relation may be given, by the particular terms of the gift, to it and the disclosing of a purpose to provide for or against immediate enjoyment. The statute in this respect purports to make no distinction between gifts to minors and gifts to adults. If there is deferment in either case the exemption is denied.
Source: Wikisource

Wiley Blount Rutledge Fondren v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue…

A fortiori, if income is to be accumulated and paid over with the corpus at a later time, the entire gift is of a future interest, [3] although upon specified contingency some portion or all of the fund may be paid over earlier. [4] The contingency may be the exercise of the trustee's discretion, either absolute or contingent. [5] It may also be the need of the beneficiary, not existing when the trust or gift takes effect legally, but arising later upon anticipated though unexpected conditions, either to create a duty in the trustee to pay over or to permit him to do so in his discretion.
Source: Wikisource

Wiley Blount Rutledge Fondren v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue…

But the regulation, adopted almost in the language of the committee reports, [11] does not limit the denial of the exception to instances where the deferment of enjoyment is at all events for a period which is definite and certain. Cf. Commissioner v. Glos, 7 Cir., 123 F.2d 548, 550. Clearly the statute is not to be applied differently, to grant or deny the exemption, if there is postponement, merely because in one case the period is under any eventuality for a certain, specified length of time, whereas in another it is of uncertain or indefinite length.
Source: Wikisource

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