Wiley Blount Rutledge

“ In each instance the statute declares that 'employer' shall mean 'any carrier * * * and any company' carrier-owned or controlled 'and which operates any equipment or facility or performs any service * * * in connection with the transportation of passengers or property * * *,' thus plainly setting forth as to others covered than the carrier both the affiliation requirement and that of performing part of the transportation service. ”

“ The decision was that the Commission has jurisdiction over state and municipally owned businesses furnishing terminal facilities. The ruling would include a fortiori privately owned independent businesses of the same type. It would be a strange reading of the 'other person' provision if forwarders alone were required to be affiliated in order to come within its terms, all others covered in both the original and the final forms of the legislative proposals being either independent or affiliated. Yet this is, in effect, appellees' exact contention and the view taken by the District Court. ”

“ A predecessor bill (H.Rep. 14337, 64th Cong.) worded the definition as follows: 'The term 'other person subject to this act' means any person not included in the term 'common carrier by water' and carrying on the business of forwarding, ferrying, towing, or furnishing transfer, lighterage, dock, warehouse, or other terminal facilities in or in connection with the foreign or interstate commerce of the United States.' (Emphasis added) As this was revised in the bill which was enacted (H.Rep. 15455, 64th Cong.) ”

“ Forwarders also have many other incidental duties. They check the marks on shipping papers and containers in order to be certain that they are in accordance with the regulations of the country of destination. They convert weights and measurements into the metric system when necessary. They keep records, for the convenience of the exporter, of all shipments dispatched. ”

“ On November 30, 1943, the District Court denied the Commission's motion for summary judgment and granted a temporary injunction restraining execution of the May 18, 1943, order. The injunction was made permanent on November 30, 1944. [4] The court held that the Maritime Commission had no jurisdiction over the appellees since, in its view, they did not come within the definition of the term 'other (persons) subject to this Act' given in § 1 of the statute, 46 U.S.C. § 801, 4 U.S.C.A. § 801. ”

“ They also prosecute such claims as may be required by the exporter against carriers, insurance companies, and any other parties in interest.
By engaging in these many activities of the forwarding business, independent forwarders-and particularly the appellees act as agents of the shipper. They assume no responsibility for the transportation of goods. ”

“ Needless to repeat, it is precisely because we think the latter effect is required by the considerations already set forth that our conclusion has been reached. Moreover, support for it is given by the very terms of the specific regulatory provisions cited to contradict it, as we have pointed out. [21] The ground need not be traversed again. ”

“ As has been stated, see note 5, in the Oakland case, except in one instance, there was no showing of affiliation with a carrier, whether by continuing agreement or otherwise.↑ It is pointed out that until the present proceeding neither the United States Maritime Commission nor its predecessor, the United States Shipping Board, attempted to exercise jurisdiction over forwarders such as the appellees. ”

“ United States; City of Oakland v. United States, supra. The absence of any such suggestion becomes highly significant by contrast with similar definitions of other statutes more or less related to the Shipping Act. In these Congress, when regulating carriers and 'other persons,' repeatedly has made plain the intent to cover only affiliates or other specially limited groups when this has been in fact its purpose.
Thus, in the legislation relating to railroads, forwarders were first covered expressly in 1942. ”