William Hubbs Rehnquist

“ To conclude that such actions constituted extortion would effectively discard the statutory requirement that property must be obtained from another, replacing it instead with the notion that merely interfering with or depriving someone of property is sufficient to constitute extortion. ”

“ Our decisions in United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 420 (1956) (explaining that "extortion...in no way depends upon having a direct benefit conferred on the person who obtains the property") , and Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987) (finding that confidential business information constitutes "property" for purposes of the federal mail fraud statute) , do not require such a result. Whatever the outer boundaries may be, the effort to characterize petitioners' actions here as an "obtaining of property from" respondents is well beyond them. ”

“ They concede, however, that for a state offense to be an "act or threat involving...extortion,...which is chargeable under State law," as RICO requires, see 18 U.S.C. §1961 (1) , the conduct must be capable of being generically classified as extortionate. Brief for Respondents 33–34. They further agree that such "generic" extortion is defined as "'obtaining something of value from another with his consent induced by the wrongful use of force, fear, or threats.'" Id., at 34 (quoting Nardello, 393 U.S., at 290) . ”

“ But even when their acts of interference and dis- [p. 405] ruption achieved their ultimate goal of "shutting down" a clinic that performed abortions, such acts did not constitute extortion because petitioners did not "obtain" respondents' property. Petitioners may have deprived or sought to deprive respondents of their alleged property right of exclusive control of their business assets, but they did not acquire any such property. Petitioners neither pursued nor received "something of value from" respondents that they could exercise, transfer, or sell. ”

“ They claimed that petitioners, all of whom were associated with PLAN, the alleged racketeering enterprise, were members of a nationwide conspiracy to "shut down" abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity that included acts of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. [3]
The District Court dismissed respondents' RICO claims for failure to allege that the predicate acts of racketeering or the racketeering enterprise were economically motivated. See National Organization for Women, Inc. ”