William J. Brennan, Jr.

“ When one of them is about to be sabotaged by a strike, § 301 has as strong a claim upon an accommodating interpretation of § 4 as does the compulsory arbitration law of the Railway Labor Act. It is equally true in both cases that ' (an injunction) alone can effectively guard the plaintiff's right,' International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 1802, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141. It is equally true in both cases that the employer's specifically enforceable obligation to arbitrate provides a 'reasonable alternative' to the strike weapon. ”

“ Only in § 302 (e) of Taft-Hartley [11] is there found a repeal of Norris-LaGuardia's anti-injunction provisions in favor of a suit by a private litigant. [12] The District Courts are there authorized to restrain the payment by employers and the acceptance by employee representatives of unauthorized payments in the nature of bribes. Not only is the problem thus dealt with 'unusually sensitive and important,' as the Court notes, [13] but the repeal of Norris-LaGuardia is clearly, predictably, and narrowly confined to one kind of suit over one kind of injury ”

“ Indeed, it might with as much force be said that Congress knew well how to limit remedies against employee activities to damages when that was what it intended, as that Congress knew how to repeal Norris-LaGuardia when that was what it intended. Section 303 of Taft-Hartley [14] authorizes private actions for damages resulting from certain concerted employee activities. ”

“ If so, § 301, a provision plainly designed to enhance the responsibility of unions to their contracts, will have had the opposite effect of depriving employers of a state remedy they enjoyed prior to its enactment. ”