William O. Douglas

“ But when we set aside the decree as respects those who gave up something of value to get it, we do an injustice. I think the applicable principle is stated in United States v. Swift & Co., supra, 286 U.S. 119, 52 S.Ct. ”

“ I agree with the Court that the union should not be disabled by that decree from carrying out the new union shop policy which Congress has made permissive. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 435-436, 15 L.Ed. 435. Certainly all employees who have joined the ranks since 1945 have no claim to its protection, as they are not included in its terms and gave nothing up in exchange for it. To construe it to include them would as a result of changing circumstances turn the consent decree 'into an instrument of wrong.' United States v. ”

“ Of those who were employed at that time, we know that some are still employed. Of the latter group, at least seven of the original 28 employees are still on the payroll. These seven released valuable claims for settling their disputes. It is harsh and unjust to deprive them of those fruits of the settlement. Whether there are others employed in 1945 who have a like claim to fair dealing is impossible to tell from the record.
We are all agreed that there is power in the District Coujrt to modify the consent decree, whether or not the power to modify was reserved. ”