Summary

by John Marshall Harlan Beckwith v. Bean — Opinion of the Court

A less liberal rule in the admission of evidence than that indicated in this opinion would often work the grossest injustice in cases where, as here, vindictive damages are sought against mere subordinates, whose testimony, if credited by the jury, would show that they acted in good faith, from a sense of public duty, and in obedience to the orders of their superior officers, who promptly assumed, and upon whom justly rested, the responsibility, not only for the prolongation of the imprisonment complained of, but for the denial of a speedy trial in the civil courts.
Source: Wikisource

by John Marshall Harlan Beckwith v. Bean — Opinion of the Court

While it is true that good faith in the original arrest and imprisonment might have been succeeded by bad faith in unnecessarily continuing the imprisonment, and in preventing a trial of Bean in the civil courts, which alone had cognizance of the specific offence charged, it was for the jury, upon all the legitimate evidence which either side could produce, to determine whether such was the fact.
Source: Wikisource

by John Marshall Harlan Beckwith v. Bean — Opinion of the Court

The court said: 'The evidence ruled out by the justice of the peace, as shown by the bill of exceptions, in no sense constituted a justification of the trespass complained of. But it was competent in mitigation of damages. The principle of permitting damages, in certain cases, to go beyond naked compensation, is for example, and the punishment of the guilty party for the wicked, corrupt, and malignant motive and design which prompted him to the wrongful act. A trespass may be committed from a mistaken notion of power, and from an honest motive to accomplish some good end.
Source: Wikisource

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