Summary

by John Marshall Stephens v. McCargo — Opinion of the Court

It would be, at least, useless, to grant an express power to the holder of a common treasury warrant, to locate the land after the forfeiture of the pre-emption right, if that power had been previously granted by the general clause, which enables him to locate waste and unappropriated land; and the limitation on the right of location, which makes it to commence after the forfeiture of the pre-emptive right, is opposed to the idea of its pre-existence.
Source: Wikisource

by John Marshall Stephens v. McCargo — Opinion of the Court

If the pre-emption warrant of Harrison had been re-entered, and had come in conflict with the entry of Stephens, made prior to its forfeiture, it must have prevailed, or the words of the law have been entirely disregarded. The act of Assembly, prolonging the time for making his entry, is certainly equivalent, while in force, to a re-entry made by himself without such act. It was in force when his entry was made, on the 5th day of June, 1786.
Upon the words of the law, then, there can be no doubt respecting the superiority of the title under Harrison, so far as it depends on the entries.
Source: Wikisource

by John Marshall Stephens v. McCargo — Opinion of the Court

That patents obtained on improper entries have prevailed against persons whose titles commenced after such patents have issued, is no authority for the opinion that such patents ought to prevail against a title which traces its commencement to a time anterior to the emanation of the patent. The only difficulty in the case consists in connecting the right of the pre-emptioner, at the time his entry was made, with the original right given by the act which opened the land office.
Source: Wikisource

Get perspective with Kwize: daily news enlightened by great literature