Summary

1911 Encyclopædia Britannica, Volume 21… (1911)

By the end of June the whole of the rival forces were concentrated about the Richmond-Petersburg defences, and General A. P. Hill had already sallied out on the 21st of June to drive the II corps from the Weldon railroad. Federal policy and Federal strategy, surmounting the crisis of Cold Harbor, were, however, at last in unison. Grant had a free hand in respect both of his dispositions and his resources in men and money, and had resolved to use unsparingly the resources placed at his disposal.
Source: Wikisource

1911 Encyclopædia Britannica, Volume 21… (1911)

Yet if General Lee had negotiated a peace on the 2nd of April military history would have lost one of the finest examples of the strategic pursuit. Lee’s proposed movement involved the transfer 0 the army and its baggage 100 m. on bad roads across the front of an enemy, and nothing but mischance could prevent the Federals intercepting Lee’s columns by a shorter route and seizing the South Side railroad, on which supplies were to be forwarded from Lynchburg to meet the retreating army at Appomattox Station, Pamplin’s Station or Farmville Station.
Source: Wikisource

1911 Encyclopædia Britannica, Volume 21… (1911)

But the Confederates ad lost White Oak road, and unless General Lee was capable of a vigorous counter stroke on his extreme right it was evident he must also lose the South Side railroad. Grant, fearing such an enterprise, at once reinforced Sheridan and ordered Humphreys’ corps (II.) to attack in his front if necessary to prevent Lee moving troops westward, but Lee made no effort, and so Sheridan was free to operate farther in the direction of the enemy’s right and rear, while Humphreys held the enemy in his front.
Source: Wikisource

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