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“9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1”, is a work by . It explores elements such as White House, transcript and interview.

Quotes from 9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1 ()

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ We have reviewed all FAA documents, transcripts, and tape recordings related to American 77 and have found no evidence that FAA headquarters issued a directive to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. Review of the same materials also indicates that no one within FAA located American 77 until the aircraft was identified by Dulles controllers at 9:32. For much of that time, American 77 was traveling through Washington Center's airspace. The Washington Center's controllers were looking for the flight, but they were not told to look for primary radar returns. ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ In reconstructing events that occurred in the PEOC on the morning of 9/11, we relied on (1) phone logs of the White House switchboard; (2) notes of Lewis Libby, Mrs. Cheney, and Ari Fleischer; (3) the tape (and then transcript) of the air threat conference call; and (4) Secret Service and White House Situation Room logs, as well as four separate White House Military Office logs (the PEOC Watch Log, the PEOC Shelter Log, the Communications Log, and the 9/11 Log) . ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ DOD report,"NORAD Strategy Review: Final Report," July 1992, p. 55.
98. For assumptions of exercise planners, see Paul Goddard and Ken Merchant interview (Mar. 4, 2004) . For the authority to shoot down a commercial aircraft prior to 9/11, granted to NORAD but not used against Payne Stewart's plane in 1999 after the pilot and passengers lost consciousness, see Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004) . A 1998 White House tabletop exercise chaired by Richard Clarke included a scenario in which a terrorist group loaded a Learjet with explosives and took off for a suicide mission to Washington. ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ The international hijacking crisis turned into a civil war, as the Jordanian government used force to restore its control of the country. See FAA report, Civil Aviation Reference Handbook, May 1999, appendix D. The FAA knew or strongly suspected that Flight 11 was a hijacking 11 minutes after it was taken over; Flight 175, 9 minutes after it was taken over. There is no evidence to indicate that the FAA recognized Flight 77 as a hijacking until it crashed into the Pentagon.
67. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, line 5114, 9:07:13; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, position 15, 9:19. ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ FAA air traffic control tapes indicate that at 9:19 the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon ordered controllers to send a cockpit warning to Delta 1989 because, like American 11 and United 175, it was a transcontinental flight departing Boston's Logan Airport.
69. For American Airlines' response, see AAL briefing (Apr. 26, 2004) . For Ballinger's warnings, see Ed Ballinger interview (Apr. 14, 2004) . A companywide order for dispatchers to warn cockpits was not issued until 9:21. See UAL report, "Timeline: Dispatch/SMFDO Activities-Terrorist Crisis," undated. ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ FBI report of investigation, interview of Lisa Jefferson, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL record, Flight 93 passenger manifest, Sept. 11, 2001.All but one of the six passengers seated in the first-class cabin communicated with the ground during the flight, and none mentioned anyone from their cabin having gone into the cockpit before the hijacking. Moreover, it is unlikely that the highly regarded and experienced pilot and co-pilot of Flight 93 would have allowed an observer into the cockpit before or after takeoff who had not obtained the proper permission. ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ See FAA regulations, Hijacked Aircraft, Order 7110.65M, para.10-2-6 (2001) ; David Bottiglia interview (Oct. 1, 2003) ; FAA report,"Crisis Management Handbook for Significant Events," Feb. 15, 2000. From interviews of controllers at various FAA centers, we learned that an air traffic controller's first response to an aircraft incident is to notify a supervisor, who then notifies the traffic management unit and the operations manager in charge.The FAA center next notifies the appropriate regional operations center (ROC) , which in turn contacts FAA headquarters. ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ See Rich Miles interview (Nov. 21, 2003) ; UAL report, "United dispatch SMFDO activities-terrorist crisis," Sept. 11, 2001.
76. In accordance with FAA regulations, United 93's cockpit voice recorder recorded the last 31 minutes of sounds from the cockpit via microphones in the pilots' headsets, as well as in the overhead panel of the flight deck. This is the only recorder from the four hijacked airplanes to survive the impact and ensuing fire. The CVRs and FDRs from American 11 and United 175 were not found, and the CVR from American Flight 77 was badly burned and not recoverable. ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ Flight 93 CVR data. A transcript of the CVR recording was prepared by the NTSB and the FBI.
77. All calls placed on airphones were from the rear of the aircraft. There was one airphone installed in each row of seats on both sides of the aisle. The airphone system was capable of transmitting only eight calls at any one time. See FBI report of investigation, airphone records for flights UAL 93 and UAL 175 on Sept. 11, 2001, Sept. 18, 2001.
78. FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, position Lorain Radar; Flight 93 CVR data; FBI report, "CVR from UA Flight #93," Dec. 4, 2003. ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ The FAA conducted many screener evaluations at Newark between September 11, 1999, and September 11, 2001. Detection rates for metal detection, physical searches, and X-rays all met or exceeded the national averages. See FAA briefing materials, "Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD," Oct. 24, 2001; see also FAA report, "United Airlines Flight 93, September 11, 2001, Executive Report," Jan. ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ While one of Ballinger's colleagues assisted him, Ballinger remained responsible for multiple flights. See Ed Ballinger interview (Apr. 14, 2004) . American Airlines' policy called for the flight dispatcher to manage only the hijacked flight, relieving him of responsibilities for all other flights. On American Airlines' policy, see Craig Marquis, Craig Parfitt, Joe Bertapelle, and Mike Mulcahy interview (Nov. 19, 2003) . ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ See NEADS audio file, channel 24. That corresponds to the time after the Otis fighters entered the holding pattern and before they headed for New York. NEADS controllers were simultaneously working with a tanker to relocate close to the Otis fighters.At 9:10, the senior director on the NEADS floor told the weapons director,"I want those fighters closer in." NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5. At 9:10:22, the Otis fighters were told by Boston Center that the second tower had been struck. ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ The Pan American plane landed in Cairo and was blown up after its passengers were released. The other three aircraft were flown to Dawson Field, near Amman, Jordan; the passengers were held captive, and the planes were destroyed. ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ American 77's route has been determined through Commission analysis of FAA and military radar data. For the evacuation of the Vice President, see White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 2; USSS memo, interview of Rocco Delmonico, Oct. 1, 2001 (evacuation of the White House) ; see also White House notes, Mary Matalin notes, Sept. 11, 2001. On the time of entering the tunnel, see USSS report,"Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service Timeline of Events, September 11-October 3, 2001," Oct. 3, 2001, p. 2. ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ A1.
91.The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a tremendous growth of the air transport industry, and the FAA's corresponding responsibilities grew enormously from the 1960s through 2001.Throughout that time, the FAA focused on setting and maintaining safety and efficiency standards. ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ At Secret Service headquarters, personnel from the intelligence division were also on a phone conference with FAA headquarters. Chuck Green interview (Mar. 10, 2004) . For notification of an inbound aircraft at 10:02, see USSS record, Intelligence Division timeline, Sept. 11, 2001; USSS record, Crisis Center Incident Monitor, Sept. 11, 2001. For the FAA's projection, see Tim Grovack interview (Apr. 8, 2004) . For Secret Service updates, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
218.White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept. ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004) ; Joseph Cooper interview (Sept. 22, 2003) ;Tim Spence interview (Sept. 30, 2003) . For general information on approaching terminals, see FAA report, "Aeronautical Information Manual," Feb. 19, 2004. Times assigned to audio transmissions were derived by the Commission from files provided by the FAA and the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) based on audio time stamps contained within the files provided by the sender. FAA tapes are certified accurate to Universal Coordinated Time by quality assurance specialists at FAA air traffic facilities. ”

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Source: Wikisource

9/11 Commission Report Notes — Part 1

“ David Wherley interview (Feb. 27, 2004) .
236.The 113th Wing first learned from the FAA tower at Andrews that the Secret Service wanted fighters air-borne.The FAA tower had been contacted by personnel at FAA headquarters, who were on an open line with senior agents from the President's detail. See Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004) ; Terry Van Steenbergen interview (Mar. 30, 2004) . ”

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