“ Millions of men and women readied themselves for work. Some made their way to the Twin Towers, the signature structures of the World Trade Center complex in New York City. Others went to Arlington, Virginia, to the Pentagon. ”

“ Military Notification and Response. NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center at 10:07. Unaware that the aircraft had already crashed, Cleveland passed to NEADS the aircraft's last known latitude and longitude. NEADS was never able to locate United 93 on radar because it was already in the ground.171
At the same time, the NEADS mission crew commander was dealing with the arrival of the Langley fighters over Washington, D.C., sorting out what their orders were with respect to potential targets. ”

“ No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77.
At 9:36, the FAA's Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discovery about an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington:"Latest report.Aircraft VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast of the White House. . . . Six, south- west. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away." This startling news prompted the mission crew commander at NEADS to take immediate control of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters:"Okay, we're going to turn it . . . crank it up. . . . ”

“ Or the flight attendants may just have been in their way.26
At the same time or shortly thereafter, Atta — the only terrorist on board trained to fly a jet — would have moved to the cockpit from his business-class seat, possibly accompanied by Omari.As this was happening, passenger Daniel Lewin, who was seated in the row just behind Atta and Omari, was stabbed by one of the hijackers — probably Satam al Suqami, who was seated directly behind Lewin. Lewin had served four years as an officer in the Israeli military. ”

“ General David Wherley — the commander of the 113th Wing — reached out to the Secret Service after hearing secondhand reports that it wanted fighters airbor ne. A Secret Service agent had a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at the White House, relaying instruc- tions that the White House agent said he was getting from the Vice President. The guidance for Wherley was to send up the aircraft, with orders to protect the White House and take out any aircraft that threatened the Capitol. ”

“ Then the Command Center informed headquarters that controllers had lost track of United 93 over the Pittsburgh area.Within seconds, the Command Center received a visual report from another aircraft, and informed head- quarters that the aircraft was 20 miles northwest of Johnstown. United 93 was spotted by another aircraft, and, at 10:01, the Command Center advised FAA headquarters that one of the aircraft had seen United 93 "waving his wings." ”

“ On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers. The operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Airport in August.73
Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. ”

“ As of September 11, 2001, the FAA was man- dated by law to regulate the safety and security of civil aviation. From an air traffic controller's perspective, that meant maintaining a safe distance between airbor ne aircraft.91
Many controllers work at the FAA's 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers. They are grouped under regional offices and coordinate closely with the national Air Traffic Control System Command Center, located in Herndon,
Virginia, which oversees daily traffic flow within the entire airspace system. ”

“ As United 93 left Newark, the flight's crew members were unaware of the hijacking of American 11.Around 9:00, the FAA,American, and United were facing the staggering realization of apparent multiple hijackings. At 9:03, they would see another aircraft strike the World Trade Center. ”

“ Manager, New York Center: We have several situations going on here. It's escalating big, big time. We need to get the military involved with us. . . . We're, we're involved with something else, we have other aircraft that may have a similar situation going on here.128 The "other aircraft" refer red to by New York Center was United 175. Evidence indicates that this conversation was the only notice received by either FAA headquarters or the Herndon Command Center prior to the second crash that there had been a second hijacking. ”

“ At 8:26, Ong reported that the plane was "flying erratically."A minute later, Flight 11 turned south. American also began getting identifications of the hijackers, as Ong and then Sweeney passed on some of the seat numbers of those who had gained unauthorized access to the cockpit.33
Sweeney calmly reported on her line that the plane had been hijacked; a man in first class had his throat slashed; two flight attendants had been stabbed — one was seriously hurt and was on oxygen while the other's wounds seemed minor ”

“ American 11 and United 175. Atta and Omari boarded a 6:00 A.M. flight from Portland to Boston's Logan International Airport. [1]
When he checked in for his flight to Boston, Atta was selected by a computerized prescreening system known as CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System) , created to identify passengers who should be subject to special security measures. Under security rules in place at the time, the only consequence of Atta's selection by CAPPS was that his checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that he had boarded the aircraft. ”

“ The security checkpoints through which passengers, including Atta and his colleagues, gained access to the American 11 gate were operated by Globe Security under a contract with American Airlines. In a different terminal, the single checkpoint through which passengers for United 175 passed was controlled by United Airlines, which had contracted with Huntleigh USA to perform the screening. ”

“ FAA Control Centers often receive information and make operational deci- sions independently of one another. On 9/11, the four hijacked aircraft were monitored mainly by the centers in Boston, New York, Cleveland, and Indi- anapolis. Each center thus had part of the knowledge of what was going on across the system.What Boston knew was not necessarily known by centers in New York, Cleveland, or Indianapolis, or for that matter by the Command Center in Herndon or by FAA headquarters in Washington. ”

“ It's getting bad, Dad — A stewardess was stabbed — They seem to have knives and Mace — They said they have a bomb — It's getting very bad on the plane — Passengers are throwing up and getting sick — The plane is making jerky movements — I don't think the pilot is flying the plane — I think we are going down — I think they intend to go to Chicago or someplace and fly into a building — Don't worry, Dad — If it happens, it'll be very fast — My God, my God.49 The call ended abruptly. ”

“ On 9/11, the terrorists turned off the transponders on three of the four hijacked aircraft.With its transponder off, it is possible, though more difficult, to track an aircraft by its primary radar returns. But unlike transponder data, pr imary radar returns do not show the aircraft's identity and altitude. Con- trollers at centers rely so heavily on transponder signals that they usually do not display primary radar returns on their radar scopes. ”

“ F-15 fighters were scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base. But NEADS did not know where to send the alert fighter aircraft, and the officer directing the fighters pressed for more information:"I don't know where I'm scrambling these guys to. I need a direction, a destination." Because the hijackers had tur ned off the plane's transponder, NEADS personnel spent the next minutes searching their radar scopes for the primary radar return. American 11 struck the North Tower at 8:46. ”

“ In upstate New York, NEADS personnel first learned of the shootdown order from this message:
Floor Leadership: You need to read this. . . . The Region Commander has declared that we can shoot down aircraft that do not respond to our direction. Copy that? Controllers: Copy that, sir. Floor Leadership: So if you're trying to divert somebody and he won't divert — Controllers: DO [Director of Operations] is saying no. Floor Leadership: No? ”

“ About this same time Sweeney reported to Woodward,"Something is wrong.We are in a rapid descent . . . we are all over the place."Woodward asked Sweeney to look out the window to see if she could determine where they were. Sweeney responded: "We are flying low. We are flying very, very low. ”

“ Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet."Air traffic controllers heard the transmission; Ong did not.The hijackers probably did not know how to operate the cockpit radio communication system correctly, and thus inadvertently broadcast their message over the air traffic control channel instead of the cabin public-address channel. ”

“ The first topic addressed in the White House video teleconference — at about 9:40 — was the physical security of the President, the White House, and federal agencies. Immediately thereafter it was reported that a plane had hit the Pentagon.We found no evidence that video teleconference participants had any prior infor- mation that American 77 had been hijacked and was heading directly toward Washington. ”

“ The Battle for United 93 At 8:42, United Airlines Flight 93 took off from Newark (New Jersey) Liberty International Airport bound for San Francisco.The aircraft was piloted by Captain Jason Dahl and First Officer Leroy Homer, and there were five flight attendants. Thirty-seven passengers, including the hijackers, boarded the plane. ”

“ If we don't we'll die!" Sixteen seconds later, a passenger yelled,"Roll it!" Jar rah stopped the violent maneuvers at about 10:01:00 and said,"Allah is the greatest! Allah is the greatest!" He then asked another hijacker in the cock- pit, "Is that it? I mean, shall we put it down?" to which the other replied,"Yes, put it in it, and pull it down."88
The passengers continued their assault and at 10:02:23, a hijacker said,"Pull it down! Pull it down!"The hijackers remained at the controls but must have judged that the passengers were only seconds from overcoming them.The air plane headed down ”

“ The President felt he should project strength and calm until he could better understand what was happening.203
The President remained in the classroom for another five to seven minutes, while the children continued reading. He then returned to a holding room shortly before 9:15, where he was briefed by staff and saw television coverage. ”

“ Has that directive been trans- mitted to the aircraft? Vice President: Yes, it has. SecDef: So we've got a couple of aircraft up there that have those instructions at this present time? Vice President: That is correct. And it's my understanding they've already taken a couple of aircraft out. SecDef: We can't confirm that.We're told that one aircraft is down but we do not have a pilot report that did it.233 As this exchange shows, Secretary Rumsfeld was not in the NMCC when the shootdown order was first conveyed. ”

“ At 8:21,American 11 turned off its transponder, immediately degrading the infor mation available about the aircraft.The controller told his supervisor that he thought something was seriously wrong with the plane, although neither suspected a hijacking.The supervisor instructed the controller to follow stan- dard procedures for handling a "no radio" aircraft.107
The controller checked to see if American Airlines could establish commu- nication with American 11. ”

“ At the end of the turn, it was descending through 2,200 feet, pointed toward the Pentagon and downtown Washington.The hijacker pilot then advanced the throttles to maximum power and dove toward the Pentagon.60
At 9:37:46, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon, travel- ing at approximately 530 miles per hour.61 All on board, as well as many civil- ian and military personnel in the building, were killed. ”

“ It resumed at 9:37 as an air threat conference call,* which lasted more than eight hours.The President,Vice President, Secretary of Defense,Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley all participated in this teleconference at various times, as did military personnel from the White House underground shelter and the President's mil- itary aide on Air Force One.195
Operators worked feverishly to include the FAA, but they had equipment problems and difficulty finding secure phone numbers. ”

“ Oct. 24, 2001.↑ Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main terminal checkpoints, Sept. 11, 2001; see also Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004) .↑ Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main terminal checkpoints, Sept. 11, 2001; see also Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004) .↑ For investigation findings, see FAA report, "American Airlines Flight #77: Hijacking and Crash into the Pentagon, Sept. 11, 2001," undated. For screener evaluations, see Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004) .↑ See AAL record, SABRE information for Flight 77, Sept. ”