United Airlines

“ Aircraft NC 35678, while operating between New York and Chicago as Trip 12 of United Airlines Transport Corporation, crashed within two blocks of the Chicago Municipal Airport about 5:48 p.m. (CST [1] ) on the afternoon of December 4, 1940. ”

“ If you take a major national airline of the United States, where this country has done a pretty good job overall providing ILSs at all our high-traffic airports, I heard a remark made by a management pilot at American Airlines shortly after one of their recent tragedies, that they surveyed their airline and found that the average American Airlines line pilot flew one non-precision approach a year. ”

“ The security checkpoints through which passengers, including Atta and his colleagues, gained access to the American 11 gate were operated by Globe Security under a contract with American Airlines. In a different terminal, the single checkpoint through which passengers for United 175 passed was controlled by United Airlines, which had contracted with Huntleigh USA to perform the screening. ”

“ At approximately 9:05 a.m., United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 9:55 a.m. At approximately 9:37 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the southwest side of the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. ”

“ Landing fields are of primary importance to safety in aviation. It is not a question of how small a field a plane can operate from, but rather of how large a field is necessary to make that operation safe.
Large and well equipped airports situated close to cities will go far towards developing commercial airlines and keeping the United States at the top in aeronautical activity.
The cities who foresee the future of air transportation and provide suitable airports will find themselves the center of airlines radiating in every direction. ”

“ The flight crew, Captain Philip Scott and First Officer George S. Young, were physically qualified and held proper certification of competency to operate as air carrier pilots over the route between New York and Chicago. Aircraft NC 25678 was currently certificated as airworthy at the time of the accident and had been maintained in accordance with company procedure and the applicable maintenance competency letters issued to United. ”

“ The basic responsibility of Airway Traffic Control is to prevent aerial collisions between aircraft operating under instrument conditions. Decisions on whether a flight is advisable, or may be made with safety, under the weather conditions existing are the responsibility of the pilot and the air carrier dispatcher. Notwithstanding this, Airway Traffic Control suggested to the United dispatcher that he advise Captain Scott that an air carrier airplane which has preceded him had accumulated an inch and a half of ice while coming through the overcast. ”

“ It demands no costly investment in fixed rights of way; its right of way is the air, which is free and infinitely flexible. Since the speed of the airplane permits it to transport goods a maximum of ton-miles for a minimum of initial investment, airline ownership of property of any kind is at a minimum. During the thirty-year life of air-mail service, the United States Post Office Department has recovered through sales of air-mail stamps alone more than it has paid out to the airlines for carrying the mails. ”

“ In addition, while it is the usual Airway Traffic Control procedure to bring aircraft into an airport by stepping them down through 1000-foot levels, Airway Traffic Control varied this procedure in the case of United 21 in order to avoid holding the trip in icing conditions while awaiting a clearance to land. Captain Scott was told to hold at 6000 feet until Airway Traffic Control could give the trip an approach clearance so that it might descend through the overcast as rapidly as possible. ”

“ A United Air Lines, Inc., Boeing 727-22, Flight 389 (UAL 389) was a regularly scheduled domestic passenger/cargo flight from LaGuardia Airport, New York to O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois. The aircraft had arrived at LaGuardia, on the date of the accident, following a trip from Los Angeles, California, with stops at Sacramento, California, Reno, Nevada, Denver, Colorado, and Chicago, Illinois. The flight crew of UAL 389 reported for duty at LaGuardia Airport one hour before scheduled departure where they prepared for the flight to Chicago. ”

“ Before flying on the civil airways under instrument weather conditions, approval must be secured from Airway Traffic Control for the flight, including the altitude at which it is to be flown. The Cleveland and the Chicago Airway Traffic Control centers were concerned with the flight of United Trip 21 between Cleveland and Chicago. The jurisdiction of the Cleveland center includes the civil airway between Cleveland and a point 25 miles east of Goshen, Indiana, and the jurisdiction of the Chicago center extends from that point to the Chicago Airport. ”

“ The record shows that since overhaul, the airplane had received the inspections and checks prescribed by United and approved by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. [2] An inspection by United's maintenance personnel is required at the end of the each scheduled trip and the inspection reports do not show any serious malfunctioning of the aircraft, the aircraft engines, or equipment since engine overhaul. The turn-around, or No. 1, inspection report made at LaGuardia Field just prior to the departure of Trip 21 shows merely the replacement of several minor pieces of equipment. ”

“ Our air transportation system is the greatest in the world and the primary public carrier in the United States. Moreover, some eighty-five percent of the aircraft in use throughout the world are of United States manufacture, and the free world's seven largest airlines are United States flag carriers. ”

“ National Airlines, Inc., is a Florida corporation with its main office at Miami, Florida. The company operates as a scheduled air carrier under a currently effective certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board and an operating certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Agency. These certificates authorize the transportation by air of persons, property and mail between various points in the United States including Miami, Florida ”

“ A United Air Lines, Inc., B-727-22, N7036U, Flight 389 crashed into Lake Michigan approximately 19.5 statute miles east of Lake Forest, Illinois, at approximately 2120 c.d.t., August 16, 1965. The 24 passengers and 6 crewmembers died in the crash and the aircraft was destroyed. ”

“ The past record of safety of air transportation within the United States, extending to over 130,000,000 miles of transport flying without serious injury to any person in the 17-month period immediately preceding the present accident and to thirteen years of operation without fatal accident by Pennsylvania Central Airlines and its predecessors, is a sufficient evidence that only the highly exceptional or the hitherto unknown would produce so tragic an effect. ”

“ The normal landing procedure for the northwest runway at Chicago is to make an approach for landing as low and with as little excess speed as possible. Mr. Addems, Superintendent of Flight Operations for United, testified that under normal conditions the approach to the northwest runway must be made with extreme accuracy. The pilot must come over the boundary with a minimum of speed and at a height of not more than 25 to 30 feet above the high tension wires bounding the field. ”

“ In recovering, the plane usually loses a minimum of 500 feet of altitude. The speed at which the stall develops is variable depending upon many factors such as loading, flap position, and degree of bank. Pilots employed by air carriers using DC-3 equipment are given periodic flight checks which include both power on and power off stalls, so that all airline pilots using this equipment are familiar with its stall characteristics. United's procedure requires such checks of its captains every six months. ”

“ When Trip 2 had reached a point about 2 miles northwest of the Denver Airport, First Officer Allan again contacted the tower and in reply to his inquiry he was told that the entire N-S runway was available, that flame pots marked its intersection with the NE-SW runway and that Trip 2 was cleared over Lowry Field. When Trip 2 was west of the field the tower called, asked if the flight was "contact" and received a reply in the affirmative. The tower operator then reported that a moderate rain was falling. At that time the visibility as observed by the crew was over five miles in all directions. ”

“ From the testimony of several airline pilots who have been using the Chicago airport for many years, it appears that the southeast-northwest runway is too short for anything but normal operation under favorable conditions with the airline equipment now in use. ”

“ Their three fellow hijackers for Flight 11 stayed together in a hotel in Newton, Massachusetts, just outside of Boston.191 Shehhi and his team targeting United Airlines Flight 175 from Logan Airport spent their last hours at two Boston hotels.192 The plan that started with a proposal by KSM in 1996 had evolved to overcome numerous obstacles. Now 19 men waited in nondescript hotel rooms to board four flights the next morning. ”

“ Courtney Tucker interview (June 3, 2004) ; Kenneth Mead prepared statement, May 22, 2003. Some air carrier officials, however, enjoyed a strong reputation for leadership in aviation security, including United Airlines' Ed Soliday. Bruce Butterworth interview (Sept. 29, 2003) ; Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003) ; Steven Jenkins interview (Feb. 24, 2004) .
60. Mike Morse interview (Sept. 15, 2003) . Regarding training, see FAA report,"Air Carrier Standard Security Program," May 2001.
61. On a hardened cockpit door making little difference, see Tim Ahern interview (Oct. 8, 2004) . ”

“ Hijackers were seated next to both the left and right aisles. On American 77 and United 93, Boeing 757 single-aisle aircraft, the pilot hijacker sat in the first row, closest to the cockpit door. See FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 67-69; AAL schematics for Flight 11 and Flight 77; UAL schematics for Flight 175 and Flight 93.
44. NTSB report, "Flight Path Study-United Airlines 175," Feb. 19, 2002; NTSB report, Air Traffic Control Recording-United Airlines Flight 175, Dec. 21, 2001.
45. See FBI report of investigation, interview of Lee Hanson, Sept. 11, 2001. ”

“ I am also an FAA certified flight instructor, airframe and powerplant mechanic, and aircraft maintenance inspector.
4. In April-May 1989, while employed at Evergreen International Airlines, I was told that at some future time I could be asked to fly United States government C-130 aircraft for Evergreen. The aircraft were based at Evergreens Marana, Arizona base and operated under the guise of the Forest Service However, the planes were used by Evergreen for non-firefighting purposes, such as carrying cargo. ”

“ A substantial amount of testimony was also received as to whether ice was present on the airplane immediately prior to impact, and if so, what, if any, effect it could have had in contributing to the stall. It has been shown previously that ice on the wings raises the stalling speed of an aircraft to some degree, depending upon many varying factors. United 21 is known to have passed through an icing condition in the overcast and the examination of the aircraft after the accident showed ice on the wings. ”

“ Furthermore, the crew was in radio contact with the approach controller at this time in routine radio transmissions relating to their approach to the Chicago area. Included in this last transmission was a reference to the latest altimeter setting. Track K 047 is assessed as being associated with UAL 389 because there was no other known or observed radar traffic in the area where the track appeared plus its correlation with track A 039 which in turn can be associated with UAL 389 by comparison of the ARTCC controller's recollection of the flight path and positions of UAL 389 over known fixes. ”

“ At 2119:36 the crew contacted ORD and was advised that radar contact had been established. At this time the aircraft target was 2-3 miles west of Sturgeon. UAL 389 was cleared to maintain 6,000 feet and to depart the Northbrook VORTAC on a heading of 240 degrees. The flight was advised that instrument landing system approaches were in progress on runway 14R at O'Hare and that the current O'Hare altimeter setting was 29.93. The pilot [3] read back the altimeter setting incorrectly, the controller corrected him, and the pilot repeated it correctly. ”

“ Captain Scott then elected to fly on top of the overcast, reporting as follows:
"United 21 OK. Will cross on top no matter what."
At 4:21 a change is clearance was requested and obtained from the Chicago Airway Traffic Control for Trip 21 to fly 500 feet on top, crossing McCool at 5500 feet. At 4:34 Trip 21 reported over Goshen 500 feet on top of the overcast, reporting on outside temperature of 33 degrees at this altitude. ”

“ The drag of the airplane is increased and the maximum lift decreased. The rate and angle of descent of the aircraft in a glide is also increased.
Several pilots who landed at Chicago on the afternoon of the crash after remaining in the icing conditions for various periods, reported an increase in the landing or stalling speed [15] and increased drag of the aircraft, requiring the use of considerable power. The ice accumulation described by these pilots was greater in amount and was in a more critical location than the ice which was found on United 21. ”

“ FAA air traffic control tapes indicate that at 9:19 the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon ordered controllers to send a cockpit warning to Delta 1989 because, like American 11 and United 175, it was a transcontinental flight departing Boston's Logan Airport.
69. For American Airlines' response, see AAL briefing (Apr. 26, 2004) . For Ballinger's warnings, see Ed Ballinger interview (Apr. 14, 2004) . A companywide order for dispatchers to warn cockpits was not issued until 9:21. See UAL report, "Timeline: Dispatch/SMFDO Activities-Terrorist Crisis," undated. ”