Antonin Scalia

“ If the first paragraph of §106 (c) means that, by reason of use of the trigger word "entity," this provision applies in all respects to governmental units, then the Government may be sued on all alleged debts, despite the prior specification in subsections (a) and (b) that claims against the Government will lie only when the Government has filed a proof of claim, and even then only as a setoff unless the claim is a compulsory counterclaim. Those earlier limitations are reduced to trivial application if paragraph (c) (1) stands on its own. ”

“ Rejecting that contention, we observed: "The fact that Congress grants jurisdiction to hear a claim does not suffice to show Congress has abrogated all defenses to that claim. The issues are wholly distinct." Id., at 787, n. 4.
Equally unpersuasive is respondent's related argument that a bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction overrides sovereign immunity. As an initial matter, the premise for that argument is missing here, since respondent did not invoke, and the Bankruptcy Court did not purport to exercise, in rem jurisdiction. ”

“ This conclusion is reached by reading the two paragraphs of subsection (c) as complementary rather than independent: The first paragraph identifies the subject matter of disputes that courts may entertain under the subsection and the second paragraph describes the relief that courts may grant in such disputes. That is to say, the second paragraph specifies the manner in which there shall be applied to governmental units the provisions identified by the first paragraph, i. e., a manner that permits declaratory or injunctive relief but not an affirmative monetary recovery. ”

“ Respondent has suggested no function to be performed by paragraph (2) if paragraph (1) operates to treat the Government like any other "entity" or "creditor," regardless of the type of relief authorized by an applicable Code provision. ”

“ In any event, we have never applied an in rem exception to the sovereign-immunity bar against monetary recovery, and have suggested that no such exception exists, see United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 502–503 (1940) . Nor does United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983) , establish such an exception, or otherwise permit the relief requested here. That case upheld a Bankruptcy Court order that the IRS [p. 39] turn over tangible property of the debtor it had seized before the debtor filed for bankruptcy protection. ”