Summary

Byron White Sullivan v. Finkelstein — Opinion of the Court

If the surviving spouse's impairment does not meet or equal one of the listed impairments, the Secretary will not find the spouse disabled; in particular, the Secretary will not consider whether the spouse's impairment nonetheless makes the spouse disabled, given the spouse's age, education, and work experience.
The Secretary's practice for spouses' disability insurance benefits thus differs significantly from the regulations for determining whether a wage earner is entitled to disability insurance benefits.
Source: Wikisource

Byron White Sullivan v. Finkelstein — Opinion of the Court

This is what Congress has done in the fourth sentence of § 405 (g) . [8] More generally, respondent argues that a power in the district court to remand to an agency is always incident to the power to review agency action and that § 405 (g) only expanded the district courts' equitable powers; therefore, she insists, it is improper to construe § 405 (g) as a limit on the district courts' power to remand. This argument misapprehends what Congress sought to accomplish in § 405 (g) . The fourth sentence of § 405 (g) does not "limit" the district courts' authority to remand.
Source: Wikisource

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