Summary

Portrait of Felix Frankfurter Felix Frankfurter Kesler v. Department of Public Safety of Utah…

To make suspension of privileges dependent upon the creditor's request, as twenty-one have done, and as Congress has done for the District of Columbia, is nothing more than to make explicit what happens in the real world regardless of the statutory language. Even if the creditor-request provision makes suspension more likely, we see no reason why a State may not so provide in order that the deterrent be made more effective by authorizing the party most likely to be interested in the enforcement of the sanction to set it in motion.
Source: Wikisource

Portrait of Felix Frankfurter Felix Frankfurter Kesler v. Department of Public Safety of Utah…

Are the differences between the Utah statute and that of New York so significant as to make a constitutionally decisive difference? A State may properly decide, as forty-five have done, that the prospect of a judgment that must be paid in order to regain driving privileges serves as a substantial deterrent to unsafe driving. We held in Reitz that it might impose this requirement despite a discharge, in order not to exempt some drivers from appropriate protection of public safety by easy refuge in bankruptcy.
Source: Wikisource

Portrait of Felix Frankfurter Felix Frankfurter Kesler v. Department of Public Safety of Utah…

A State cannot deal with the debtor-creditor relationship as such and circumvent the aim of the Bankruptcy Act in lifting the burden of debt from a worthy debtor and affording him a new start. The limitations imposed upon the States by the Act raise constitutional questions under the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI Thus, a discharge does not free the bankrupt from all traces of the debt, as though it had never been incurred.
Source: Wikisource

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