John Paul Stevens

“ Respondents suggest that if Congress had intended to have the statute's prohibition against vote dilution apply to the election of judges, it would have used the word "candidates" instead of "representatives." Brief for Respondents 20, and n. 9. But that confuses the ordinary meaning of the words. The word "representative" refers to someone who has prevailed in a popular election, whereas the word "candidate" refers to someone who is seeking an office. Thus, a candidate is nominated, not elected. ”

“ Respondents argue, and the majority agreed, that the term "representatives" was used to extend § 2 coverage to executive officials, but not to judges. We think, however, that the better reading of the word "representatives" describes the winners of representative, popular elections. If executive officers, such as prosecutors, sheriffs, state attorneys general, and state treasurers, can be considered "representatives" simply because they are chosen by popular election, then the same reasoning should apply to elected judges. ”

“ The fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office and the real world of electoral politics cannot be resolved by crediting judges with total indifference to the popular will while simultaneously requiring them to run for elected office. ”

“ Before beginning its analysis, the court remarked that " [i] t is particularly significant that no black person has ever been elected to the Louisiana Supreme Court, either from the First Supreme Court District or from any one of the other five judicial districts." 839 F.2d, at 1058. After agreeing with the recently announced opinion in Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (CA6 1988) , it noted that the broad definition of the terms "voting" and "vote" in § 14 (c) (1) of the original Act expressly included judicial elections within the coverage of § 2. ”

“ It is unlikely that Congress intended such an anomalous result.
Finally, both respondents and the LULAC majority suggest that no judicially manageable standards for deciding vote dilution claims can be fashioned unless the standard is based on the one-person, one-vote principle. [31] They reason that because we have held the one-person, one-vote rule inapplicable to judicial elections, see Wells v. ”