John Paul Stevens

“ Congress' exclusion of municipal corporations from the definition of persons under § 1983, we concluded, evinced an intent to preclude the exercise of federal-court jurisdiction over them. If congressional silence were sufficient to defeat pendent jurisdiction, the careful reasoning in our Aldinger opinion was wholly unnecessary, for obviously the civil rights statutes do not affirmatively authorize the joinder of any state-law claims. ”

“ Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged. Yet because the Hurn question involves issues of jurisdiction as well as convenience, there has been some tendency to limit its application to cases in which the state and federal claims are, as in Hurn, 'little more than the equivalent of different epithets to characterize the same group of circumstances.' 289 U.S., at 246, 53 S.Ct., at 590. ”

“ But the rules of procedure in the admiralty and civil jurisdictions were merged in 1966, and we are of the opinion that at least since that merger, the constitutional rationale which underlies the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in the context of Rule 13 (a) and Rule 14 may be applied to support the conclusion that a federal court has the power to hear a related state claim against a defendant not named in the federal claim regardless of whether the federal claim arises in the civil or admiralty jurisdiction. ”

“ This is especially the case when, by virtue of the grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction, "only in a federal court may all of the claims be tried together." Aldinger, 427 U.S., at 18, 96 S.Ct., at 2422. In such circumstances, in which Congress has unequivocally indicated its intent that the federal right be litigated in a federal forum, there is reason to believe that Congress did not intend that the substance of the federal right be diminished by the increased costs in efficiency and convenience of litigation in two forums. ”

“ If a case is not within one of the specified categories, neither Congress nor the parties may authorize a federal court to decide it. [2] Objections to a federal court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case cannot be waived. [3] Although Article III strictly confines the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts, it does not limit the extent of the courts' personal jurisdiction over individual parties [4] or their power to decide individual claims in cases within any of the specified categories. ”

“ Gibbs establishes that the pendent jurisdiction doctrine is designed to enable courts to handle cases involving state-law claims in the way that will best accommodate the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, and Gibbs further establishes that the judicial branch is to shape and apply the doctrine in that light. ”

“ It is also undisputed that this power will not be defeated by the joinder of two private defendants. Rule 14 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly authorizes the defendant to implead joint tortfeasors, [8] and this Rule is applicable to FTCA cases. [9] Moreover, if the claim against nonfederal defendants had been properly brought in a federal court, those defendants could require the United States to defend their claim for contribution in that action. [10] The dispute between all the parties derives from a common nucleus of operative fact. ”

“ To be sure " [w] hatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by a particular statute can . . . be changed by Congress,"S ante, at 556, but that does not relieve us of our responsibility to be faithful to the congressional design. The Court is quite incorrect to presume that because Congress did not sanction the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction in the diversity context, it has not permitted its exercise with respect to claims within the exclusive federal jurisdiction. ”

“ Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 709, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1470, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("In the course of a century or more a steadily expanding conception of public morality regarding 'governmental responsibility' has led to a 'generous policy of consent for suits against the government' to compensate for the negligence of its agents as well as to secure obedience to its contracts") ; Great Northern Life Ins. Co. ”

“ The Court's unanimous opinion [13] in Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) , highlights the modern conception of a "civil action" and a "constitutional case." At issue was the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over a state-law claim in an action brought under the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947. [14] We wrote: "Hurn was decided in 1933, before the unification of law and equity by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. t the time, the meaning of 'cause of action' was a subject of serious dispute ”

“ United States Government, 595 F.2d 65, 69-70 (CA1 1979) .↑ Rule 14 (a) provides in part:↑ "Of course there is no immunity from suit by the Government to collect claims for contribution due it from its joint tort-feasors. The Government should be able to enforce this right in a federal court not only in a separate action but by impleading the joint tort-feasor as a third-party defendant. See 3 Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed. 1948) 507, et seq. It is fair that this should work both ways." United States v. ”