John Paul Stevens

“ Indeed, just last Term we unanimously held that a public figure "may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . without showing . . . that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made . . . with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true." ”

“ Unlike the District Court, however, we were unwilling to infer actual malice from the finding that the witness "refused to admit [his mistake] and steadfastly attempted to maintain that no mistake had been made-that the inaccurate was accurate." Id., at 512, 104 S.Ct., at 1966.↑ The Court of Appeals asserted:↑ Nor can petitioner claim immunity from suit because portions of Thompson's account of the relevant events were confirmed by Connaughton. " [T] he defamer may be [all] the more successful when he baits the hook with truth." ”

“ The New York Times decision, in his view, was primarily driven by the repugnance of seditious libel and a concern that public official libel "lay close" to this universally renounced, and long-defunct, doctrine. 388 U.S., at 153, 87 S.Ct., at 1990. In place of the actual malice standard, Justice Harlan suggested that a public figure need only make "a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." ”

“ Finally, discrepancies in the testimony of Journal News witnesses may have given the jury the impression that the failure to conduct a complete investigation involved a deliberate effort to avoid the truth. Thus, for example, Blount's superiors testified that they understood that Blount had directed reporter Tom Grant to ask the police whether Thompson had repeated her charges against Connaughton to them and whether they considered her a credible witness. ”

“ This rule is not simply premised on common-law tradition, [33] but on the unique character of the interest protected by the actual malice standard. Our profound national commitment to the free exchange of ideas, as enshrined in the First Amendment, demands that the law of libel carve out an area of " 'breathing space' " so that protected speech is not discouraged. Gertz, 418 U.S., at 342, 94 S.Ct., at 3008 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963) ) ; New York Times Co., 376 U.S., at 272, 84 S.Ct., at 721-722 (same) . ”

“ Credibility determinations fall in this category, as does the issue of knowledge of falsity. But as I observed in dissent in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 515, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1967, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) , the reckless disregard component of the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan "actual malice" standard is not a question of historical fact. A trial court's determination of that issue therefore is to be reviewed independently by the appellate court. ”

“ However, if the Journal News ad serious doubts concerning the truth of Thompson's remarks, but was committed to running the story, there was good reason not to interview Stephens while denials coming from Connaughton's supporters might be explained as motivated by a desire to assist Connaughton, a denial coming from Stephens would quickly put an end to the story. ”

“ The hesitant, inaudible, and sometimes unresponsive and improbable tone of Thompson's answers to various leading questions raise obvious doubts about her veracity. Moreover, contrary to petitioner's contention that the prepublication interview with Connaughton confirmed the factual basis of Thompson's statements, Brief for Petitioner 47, review of the tapes makes clear that Connaughton unambiguously denied each allegation of wrongful conduct. ”

“ Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335, 66 S.Ct. 1029, 1031, 90 L.Ed. 1295 (1946) (clear and present danger to integrity of court) .↑ Of course, the protection of "calculated falsehoods" does not promote self-determination. As we observed in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964) :↑ Petitioner concedes that "when conducting the independent review mandated by New York Times and Bose, a reviewing court should properly hesitate to disregard a jury's opportunity to observe live testimony and assess witness credibility." Brief for Petitioner 36, n. 45. ”

“ When a candidate enters the political arena, he or she "must expect that the debate will sometimes be rough and personal," Ollman v. Evans, 242 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 333, 750 F.2d 970, 1002 (1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring) , cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127, 105 S.Ct. 2662, 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985) , and cannot " 'cry Foul!' when an opponent or an industrious reporter attempts to demonstrate" that he or she lacks the "sterling integrity" trumpeted in campaign literature and speeches, Monitor Patriot Co. ”