John Paul Stevens

“ Thus, a pre-enforcement overbreadth challenge is ripe so long as the party can show that state actors will foreseeably apply a facially invalid law in a way that determines his rights. He need not show, in addition, that state actors are about to apply the law to third parties in the precise manner that renders the law facially invalid. As I have shown, respondents demonstrate a ripe dispute by credibly alleging that petitioners will apply § 6 (b) in a manner that determines respondents' right to receive election-related speech in official voter pamphlets. ”

“ In my opinion, competing prudential factors clearly support considering respondents' overbreadth challenge first in this case. Unlike the situation in Fox, the as-applied challenge here is actually more difficult to resolve than is the overbreadth challenge. Insofar as they attack petitioners' redaction policy as unconstitutional, respondents must be understood to argue that they have a right to receive particular messages by means of official voter pamphlets or a right to communicate their own messages by that means. ”

“ Essentially ignoring the wealth of relevant case law, the majority proceeds as if the justiciability questions presented by this case-questions of standing and ripeness-were novel and unresolved. On the issue of standing, the majority purports to find "serious questions" concerning respondents' entitlement to challenge § 6 (b) . Ante, at 318. Since mere "questions" about standing cannot sustain the dismissal of a suit, one wonders why the majority offers dicta of this kind. As it turns out, the majority uses this opportunity to espouse a novel basis for denying a party standing ”

“ And, as in Eu, this prohibition is unsupported by any legitimate compelling state interest. Petitioners assert that § 6 (b) advances a compelling state interest because it assures that "local government and judges in California are . . . controlled by the people [rather than] by those who run political parties." Brief for Petitioners 7. The only kind of "control" that § 6 (b) seeks to prohibit, however, is that which "those who run political parties" are able to exert over voters through issuing party endorsements. ”

“ The majority never bothers to explain how the identity of the endorsed candidates, the "nature" of the endorsement, the mode of publicity (outside of candidate statements submitted for inclusion in voter pamphlets) , or the precise language that petitioners might delete from the pamphlets affects the merits of respondents' challenge. Indeed, it is quite apparent that none of these questions is relevant. In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 109 S.Ct. ”

“ Justice MARSHALL concludes that Article II, § 6 (b) of the California Constitution is invalid on its face because it is overbroad. Justice WHITE, on the other hand, concludes that respondents' complaint may not be construed as including a facial overbreadth challenge, and that § 6 (b) is valid insofar as it is applied to petitioners' policy of refusing to include endorsements in candidates' campaign mailings. ”

“ The majority nevertheless speculates that there is no standing here because a provision in the California Elections Code "might be construed to prevent candidates from mentioning party endorsements in voter pamphlets, even in the absence of § 6 (b) ." Ante, at 319. That makes no sense. A constitutional challenge to a law is not barred merely because other laws might also mandate the allegedly unconstitutional action. ”

“ And, whereas the special benefits conferred by state law in Austin "enhance [d] " the corporations' "ability to attract capital," id., at ----, 110 S.Ct., at 1397, the benefits California confers upon parties-e.g., permitting taxpayers to make voluntary contributions to parties on their tax returns-should have little effect on the parties' acquisition of political capital. In sum, the prospect that voters might be persuaded by party endorsements is not a corruption of the democratic political process; it is the democratic political process. ”

“ Ante, at 328, 330. But neither the majority nor Justice WHITE explains why a party raising an overbreadth challenge must seek to enjoin applications of an invalid law other than the application that is injuring him. Moreover, to require a broader request for injunctive relief here would be both unfair and unnecessary. Although respondents know which officials should be enjoined in order to halt the redaction of voter pamphlets, respondents cannot know who will next enforce § 6 (b) against party central committees that seek to endorse nonpartisan candidates. ”

“ Finally, this injury would, in my view, be redressed by the relief requested by respondents, for an injunction against the redaction policy would prevent petitioners from continuing to block respondents' access to committee endorsements in voter pamphlets.
The majority's "doubt" about respondents' entitlement to proceed on a listener-standing theory [3] relates wholly to redressability. The majority notes that a provision in the California Election Code bars inclusion of a candidate's party affiliation in the statement submitted for publication in a voter pamphlet. ”

“ The majority vacates the judgment below and remands the case with instructions to dismiss. It does so not because it disagrees with the merits of respondents' constitutional claim; indeed, the majority never reaches the merits. ”

“ It is well settled that " ' [o] ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.' " Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 2308, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) , quoting Pennsylvania v. ”