Linda V. Parker

“ By asking the Court to find that they have made out claims under the clauses due to alleged violations of the Michigan Election Code, Plaintiffs ask the Court to find that any alleged deviation from state election law amounts to a modification of state election law and opens the door to federal review. Plaintiffs cite to no case—and this Court found none—supporting such an expansive approach.
b. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause Most election laws will “impose some burden upon individual voters.” ”

“ Voting rights can be impermissibly burdened “by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” Id. (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555) .
Plaintiffs attempt to establish an Equal Protection claim based on the theory that Defendants engaged in “several schemes” to, among other things, “destroy,” “discard,” and “switch” votes for President Trump, thereby “devalu [ing] Republican votes” and “diluting” the influence of their individual votes. ”

“ Lastly, as Congress conferred concurrent jurisdiction on state courts to adjudicate § 1983 claims, Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988) , “ [t] here can be no legitimate contention that the [Michigan] state courts are incapable of safeguarding [the rights protected under this statute] ,” Romine, 160 F.3d at 342.
For these reasons, abstention is appropriate under the Colorado River doctrine. The Court finds it unnecessary to decide whether abstention is appropriate under other doctrines. ”

“ With nothing but speculation and conjecture that votes for President Trump were destroyed, discarded or switched to votes for Vice President Biden, Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim fails. [11] See Wood, 2020 WL 7094866 (quoting Bognet, 2020 WL 6686120, at *12) (“‘ [N] o single voter is specifically disadvantaged’ if a vote is counted improperly, even if the error might have a ‘mathematical impact on the final tally and thus on the proportional effect of every vote.’”) . ”

“ Co., 553 U.S. 1, 9 (2008) (“A constitutional claim can become time-barred just as any other claim can.”) . An action may be barred by the doctrine of laches if: (1) the plaintiff delayed unreasonably in asserting his rights and (2) the defendant is prejudiced by this delay. Brown-Graves Co. v. Central States, Se. and Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 206 F.3d 680, 684 (6th Cir. 2000) ; Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Logan, 577 F.3d 634, 639 n.6 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Laches arises from an extended failure to exercise a right to the detriment of another party.”) . Courts apply laches in election cases. ”

“ Plaintiffs argue that, as “nominees of the Republican Party to be Presidential Electors on behalf of the State of Michigan, they have standing to allege violations of the Elections Clause and Electors Clause because “a vote for President Trump and Vice-President Pence in Michigan ... is a vote for each Republican elector [] , and ... illegal conduct aimed at harming candidates for President similarly injures Presidential Electors.” ”

“ The real interests served by the Eleventh Amendment are not to be sacrificed to elementary mechanics of captions and pleading. Application of the Young exception must reflect a proper understanding of its role in our federal system and respect for state courts instead of a reflexive reliance on an obvious fiction. ”

“ Plaintiffs fail to establish that the alleged injury of vote-dilution can be redressed by a favorable decision from this Court. Plaintiffs ask this Court to de-certify the results of the 2020 General Election in Michigan. But an order de-certifying the votes of approximately 2.8 million people would not reverse the dilution of Plaintiffs’ vote. To be sure, standing is not “dispensed in gross: A plaintiff’s remedy must be tailored to redress the plaintiff’s particular injury.” ”

“ But according to Plaintiffs themselves, “ [m] anipulation of votes was apparent shortly after the polls closed on November 3, 2020.” (ECF No. 7 at Pg ID 1837 (emphasis added) .) Indeed, where there is no reasonable explanation, there can be no true justification. See Crookston v. Johnson, 841 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 2016) (identifying the “first and most essential” reason to issue a stay of an election-related injunction is plaintiff offering “no reasonable explanation for waiting so long to file this action”) . Defendants satisfy the first element of their laches defense. ”

“ Plaintiffs’ alleged injury does not entitle them to seek their requested remedy because the harm of having one’s vote invalidated or diluted is not remedied by denying millions of others their right to vote. ”

“ For example, the closest Plaintiffs get to alleging that physical ballots were altered in such a way is the following statement in an election challenger’s sworn affidavit: “I believe some of these workers were changing votes that had been cast for Donald Trump and other Republican candidates.” [9] (ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 902 ¶ 91 (citing Aff. Articia Bomer, ECF No. 6-3 at Pg ID 1008-1010) .) But of course, “ [a] belief is not evidence” and falls far short of what is required to obtain any relief, much less the extraordinary relief Plaintiffs request. ”

“ Second, Plaintiffs’ delay prejudices Defendants. See Kay v. Austin, 621 F.2d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1980) (“As time passes, the state’s interest in proceeding with the election increases in importance as resources are committed and irrevocable decisions are made, and the candidate’s claim to be a serious candidate who has received a serious injury becomes less credible by his having slept on his rights.”) This is especially so considering that Plaintiffs’ claims for relief are not merely last-minute—they are after the fact. While Plaintiffs delayed, the ballots were cast; the votes were counted ”

“ As summarized in Defendants’ response brief and reflected in their exhibits (see ECF No. 31 at Pg ID 2193-97; see also ECF Nos. 31-7, 31-9, 31-11, 31-12, 31-14) , the allegations and claims in the state court proceedings and the pending matter are, at the very least, substantially similar, Romine, 160 F.3d at 340 (“Exact parallelism is not required; it is enough if the two proceedings are substantially similar.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ) . ”