Summary

Portrait of Mary Whiton Calkins Mary Whiton Calkins Kant's Conception of the Leibniz Space and Time Doctrine (1897)

From the puzzling nature of time, finally, Leibniz reasons, just as Kant does, to its ideality. “Everything of time,” he says, “which exists, is successive, and so perishes continually; and how can a thing exist eternally which, to speak exactly, never exists? ... Only instants of time exist, and the instant is not even a part of time. Therefore time could not be anything except ideal (le temps ne saurait être qu‘une chose idéelle) ; and the analogical relation of time and space will make us consider one as ideal as the other.”
Source: Wikisource

Portrait of Mary Whiton Calkins Mary Whiton Calkins Kant's Conception of the Leibniz Space and Time Doctrine (1897)

The very Leibnizian definition of space, ‘confusedly apprehended relations of things-in-themselves,’ is then a contradiction in terms. Looked at from the point of view of the confusedness, space and time, whatever one call them, are really phenomenal; and it is in this way that they gain the advantage over the hopelessly fixed absolutes of the Newtonian theory. In other words, Kant declares that Leibniz really describes his related things-in-themselves as if they were phenomena, so that it is as proper to use one term as the other in describing them.
Source: Wikisource

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