Summary

Portrait of Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Old Chief v. United States — Dissenting Opinion

Moreover, crimes have names; a defendant is not convicted of some indeterminate, unspecified "crime." Nor do I think that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 can be read to obviate the well accepted principle, grounded in both the Constitution and in our precedent, that the Government may not be forced to accept a defendant's concession to an element of a charged offense as proof of that element.
Source: Wikisource

Portrait of Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Old Chief v. United States — Dissenting Opinion

Further, a defendant's tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the crime does not remove the prosecution's burden to prove that element. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991) . At trial, a defendant may thus choose to contest the Government's proof on every element; or he may concede some elements and contest others; [p200] or he may do nothing at all. Whatever his choice, the Government still carries the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on each element.
Source: Wikisource

Portrait of Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Old Chief v. United States — Dissenting Opinion

But I cannot agree with the Court that it was unfairly prejudicial for the Government to establish an essential element [p194] of its case against petitioner with direct proof of his prior conviction. The structure of § 922 (g) (1) itself shows that Congress envisioned jurors' learning the name and basic nature of the defendant's prior offense. Congress enacted § 922 (g) (1) to prohibit the possession of a firearm by any person convicted of "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year."
Source: Wikisource

Get perspective with Kwize: daily news enlightened by great literature