Supreme Court of the United States

Summary

Supreme Court of the United States Jack Daniel's Properties v. VIP Products (2023)

On infringement, we hold only that Rogers does not apply when the challenged use of a mark is as a mark. On dilution, we hold only that the noncommercial exclusion does not shield parody or other commentary when its use of a mark is similarly source-identifying. It is no coincidence that both our holdings turn on whether the use of a mark is serving a source-designation function. The Lanham Act makes that fact crucial, in its effort to ensure that consumers can tell where goods come from.
Source: Wikisource

Supreme Court of the United States Jack Daniel's Properties v. VIP Products (2023)

Today, the Court rightly concludes that, even taken on its own terms, Rogers does not apply to cases like the one before us. But in doing so, we necessarily leave much about Rogers unaddressed. For example, it is not entirely clear where the Rogers test comes from—is it commanded by the First Amendment, or is it merely gloss on the Lanham Act, perhaps inspired by constitutional-avoidance doctrine? Id., at 998. For another thing, it is not obvious that Rogers is correct in all its particulars—certainly, the Solicitor General raises serious questions about the decision.
Source: Wikisource

Supreme Court of the United States Jack Daniel's Properties v. VIP Products (2023)

VIP’s conduct is its own admission that it is using the Bad Spaniels (née Jack Daniel’s) trademarks as trademarks, to identify product source.
Because that is so, the only question in this suit going forward is whether the Bad Spaniels marks are likely to cause confusion. There is no threshold test working to kick out all cases involving “expressive works.” But a trademark’s expressive message—particularly a parodic one, as VIP asserts—may properly figure in assessing the likelihood of confusion.
Source: Wikisource

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