Thomas Davidson

“ The more completely the actions of the individual correspond to these social needs, the more moral and dutiful he is. "So far as an act is done unwillingly, under constraint, so far the act is impure and undutiful" (p. 155) . Of course, the social need is always a need for fuller activity, and dutiful acts are those which contribute to make this possible. "Morality is activity" (p. 220) ; immorality is inactivity. (2) Freedom Professor Dewey distinguishes into negative, potential, and positive. ”

“ It brings out clearly Plato's notion of ethics, showing that they are naturalistic and eudæmonistic, conceding the form of the virtuous life to be harmony, inner and outer, and its aim to be happiness, individual and social. Rosmini expressed this by saying that Plato's ethical ideal was the "unity of human perfection." ”

“ In the realization of individuality there is found also the needed realization of some community of persons [why not individuals?] of which the individual is a member; and conversely, the agent who duly satisfies the community in which he shares, by that same conduct satisfies himself. ”

“ Here it is clear that the converse, if it is really to be a converse, must mean: in the realizatoin of any community of persons [individuals?] having individuals as its members, is found the needed realization of individuality—a statement which certainly no one will call in question, but which is, unfortunately, a mere tautology. Whence it follows that the original proposition is also a tautology; for that whose converse is a tautology is itself a tautology. ”

“ The harmonious working of all parts in the matter of the rule of reason is σωφροσύνη. ↑ In the function of the several parts of the soul no distinction is made; in each case the function is τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. In this respect all of the elements are on equal footing with regard to the virtue δικαιοσύνη. ↑ Δικαιοσύνη is in this case purely a virtue of the individual parts, quite as much as σοφία or ἀνδρεία, while σωφροσύνη is a harmony of the entire soul arising out of δικαιοσύνη. ”

“ There seems to be no other difference between this will-activity and the "fire" (πῦρ, πρηστήρ) of Herakleitos than the name; for that philosopher conceived his fire as determining itself according to a Ao'yos, and as including both the divine and human minds. We are, accordingly, prepared for a statement like this: "To regard even a Divine Being as the author of obligation is to make it a form of external constraint, appealing to hope or fear [why not to love?] , unless this Divine Being is shown to be organically [why not morally and affectively?] , connected with the self" ”

“ Professor Dewey does not make it very clear whether he means it to exclude or include a man's "ideal of himself" On page 181, indeed, he seems to identify the two; but, if they are identical, it is difficult to see where remorse comes from; for remorse seems to be the judgment of the ideal self upon certain actions of the realized self. Or, does Professor Dewey mean to say that the character which chooses an action before its performance is no longer (thanks to that action) the character which judges it afterwards? ”

“ We may express this by saying that the individual, as such, lives and moves and has his being in a community of persons, and that without this he would have no individual life, motion, or being. The community, moreover, is a process, an activity, made up of the organized activities of all the individuals composing it, and the end or well-being (τὸ εὖ) of the community and its members means the highest possible amount of organized activity which they can be made to put forth. This organized activity is objective morality; it is the "chief end of man"; it is The Good ”

“ If ever it does so, it will undoubtedly adapt itself to the American mind, with its clearness, rapidity, and demand for available results.
Thomas Davidson.
↑ 1. The rational element has for its ally the spirited element. 2. Both the spirited and concupiscent elements are subject to the rule of the rational part. 3. ”