W. Keith Hancock and Margaret M. Gowing

Summary

W. Keith Hancock and Margaret M. Gowing British War Economy — Chapter IX.

While we will do our utmost, and shrink from no proper sacrifice to make payments across the Exchange, I believe you will agree that it would be wrong in principle and mutually disadvantageous in effect, if at the height of this struggle, Great Britain were to be divested of all salable assets, so that after the victory was won with our blood, civilisation saved, and the time gained for the United States to be fully armed against all eventualities, we should stand stripped to the bone.
Source: Wikisource

W. Keith Hancock and Margaret M. Gowing British War Economy — Chapter IX.

Issues so crucial and so intricately tangled called for skillful and firm handling on the British side. At every point the British had much to lose: at every point their losses might be severe if they failed to strike a just balance between their competing claims; if they failed to argue their case as a whole. This had always been the doctrine of Purvis—and of Monnet, who in July 1940 went to America to take service under Purvis. [9] During the nine months between the fall of France and the advent of lend-lease, the doctrine embodied itself with reasonable success in organisation and policy.
Source: Wikisource

W. Keith Hancock and Margaret M. Gowing British War Economy — Chapter IX.

We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation, and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment equal to the task of any emergency and every defence.
But how to balance these two objectives—immediate aid to British democracy which was already an 'opponent of force', and the equipment of American democracy which might oppose the same force later on?
Source: Wikisource

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