Wiley Blount Rutledge

“ That fact itself may be of such weight as to turn the scales the other way, even in situations much more doubtful than the present one. In short, the so-called general principles government the exercise of jurisdiction in equity are not to be taken in such a case as isolated from all effect of the legislative mandate or necessarily or even readily as overriding it.
In the first place, there can be no doubt of the availability or indeed of the certainty and effectiveness of appellant's remedy at law by suit upon its contracts against its customers claimed to owe it money under those agreements. ”

“ For it seems obvious, in view of the Act's terms, history, objects and the policies incorporated, that Congress clearly and at the very least intended the Tax Court's functions not only to be put in motion but to be fully performed, before judicial intervention should take place at the instance of one in appellant's position. ”

“ Where the intent of Congress is clear to require administrative determination, either to the exclusion of judicial action or in advance of it, a strong showing is required, both the inadequacy of the prescribed procedure and of impending harm, to permit short-circuiting the administrative process. ”

“ And on the same basis it is asserted that Aircraft's remedy by suit against its customers would require institution of numerous actions in different jurisdictions, resulting in expense and delay, as well as loss of good will and incurring the continued risk of the customers' solvency. [16] Accordingly Aircraft claims that jurisdiction in equity is conferred upon the District Court both by reason of the multiplicity of suits involved in asserting the legal remedy by actions against its customers and because of the injurious consequences which would follow from pursuing that course. ”

“ In the absence of either kind of showing, the injury appellant seeks to avoid by the argument of multiplicity actually comes down, as we have said, to deprivation of the use of the amount withheld for the period required for completion of the Tax Court proceedings or a test suit against a customer. Whether or not there will be any injury in this limited respect depends of course, first, on the outcome of the Tax Court proceedings, particularly in relation to the matters of coverage ”

“ The Tax Court may decide entirely in appellant's favor. Indeed, if it can sustain there the claims and issues it offers to support here, that possibility is not an unlikely one. For, apart from the questions of constitutionality and of the Tax Court's power to decide them finally or otherwise, [35] appellant has put forward, in both proceedings, [36] claims of exemption and noncoverage relating to contracts involving much arger amou nts than the aggregate sums affected by renegotiation, after deduction of tax credits. ”

“ These appellant seeks to establish in its showing relating to multiplicity of suits and irreparable injury. Apart from multiplicity, the showing concerning injury certainly would not be sufficient to justify eliminating the Tax Court proceeding. [42] Boiled down, the allegations come to appellant's assuming, for the period necessary to secure either the Tax Court's decision or final judgment in suits against its customers directed to withhold, the continued risk of their solvency, without specific allegation that any of them is seriously so threatened or facts to support such a claim ”

“ The very fact that Congress has made the direction must be cast into the scales as against the factors which, without that fact, would or might be of sufficient weight to turn the balance in favor of allowing utilization of equity's resources. ”

“ And that procedure was chosen deliberately in preference to judicial review in the Court of Claims or elsewhere, primarily because of the Tax Court's [27] expertness in fiscal matters analogous to those arising in connection with renegotiation problems, [28] as well as its essentially judicial procedures and exerience. [29]
It is equally clear that Congress intended to endow the Tax Court's decisions with a very large degree of finality, as appears from the very terms of § 403 (e) (1) , from the whole structure of the Act, and from the legislative history. ”

“ A single test suit would serve the former purpose fully, and there are no allegations of fact sufficient to show that appellant's rights of recourse against others probably would be lost by awaiting the outcome of such a suit, either legally through the operation of statutes of limitations or practically, as we have said, through any probable incidence of insolvency. ”

“ If invalid, appellant's right to recover remains unimpaired. The sufficiency of the defense may be as readily tested in a suit at law to recover the royalties as by the present suit in equity, to enjoin payment of the royalties into the Treasury. In either case appellant would receive all the relief to which it shows itself entitled.' 323 U.S. at page 323, 65 S.Ct. at page 302, 89 L.Ed. 264.↑ It is alleged that appellant, unless allowed to maintain this suit, will be caused unnecessarily to run the risk of impaired credit or insolvency of customers directed to withhold funds ”

“ We do not think the differences mentioned are sufficient to distinguish the cases for purposes of applying the exhaustion rule. Certainly no such effect can be derived from the fact that in the Waterman case the plaintiff had not begun the administrative process, while here Aircraft has gone as far as it can. The doctrine, wherever applicable, does not require merely the initiation of prescribed administrative procedures. ”

“ The difference, it is urged, is between action affecting only the withholding of government moneys and action effective to bring about collection from third persons of moneys claimed to be due to the Government. ”

“ No more should it be forestalled by decision upon the matters of coverage. Macauley v. Waterman S.S.C.orporation, supra.
It is true that the presence of constitutional questions, coupled with a sufficient showing of inadequacy of prescribed administrative relief and of threatened or impending irreparable injury flowing from delay incident to following the prescribed procedure, has been held sufficient to dispense with exhausting the administrative process before instituting judicial intervention. ”

“ See also note 13.↑ An earlier petition was dismissed on motion of the United States because it was filed during the time when the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board might have initiated a review. Cf. Macauley v. Waterman S.S.C.orporation, 327 U.S. 540, 66 S.Ct. 712, 90 L.Ed. 839. After dismissal of the earlier petition and before filing of the later one, appellant had sought redetermination, pursuant to § 403 (e) (1) of the Second Renegotiation Act, by the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board. ”