Wiley Blount Rutledge

Summary

Wiley Blount Rutledge Prudential Insurance Company v…

Nor is it necessary to conclude that Congress, by enacting the McCarran Act, sought to validate every existing state regulation or tax. For in all that mass of legislation must have lain some provisions which may have been subject to serious question on the score of other constitutional limitations in addition to commerce clause objections arising in the dormancy of Congress' power. And we agree with Prudential that there can be no inference that Congress intended to circumvent constitutional limitations upon its own power.
Source: Wikisource

Wiley Blount Rutledge Prudential Insurance Company v…

Prudential's misconception relates not to the necessity for applying, but to the nature and scope of the negative function f the commerce clause. It is not the simple, clean-cutting tool supposed. Nor is its swath always correlative with that cut by the affirmative edge, as seems to be assumed. For cleanly as the commerce clause has worked affirmatively on the whole, its implied negative operation on state power has been uneven, at times highly variable. More often than not, in matters more governable by logic and less by experience, the business of negative implication is slippery.
Source: Wikisource

Wiley Blount Rutledge Prudential Insurance Company v…

The commerce clause is in no sense a limitation upon the power of Congress over interstate and foreign commerce. On the contrary, it is, as Marshall declared in Gibbons v. Ogden, a grant to Congress of plenary and supreme authority over those subjects. The only limitation it places upon Congress' power is in respect to what constitutes commerce, including whatever rightly may be found to affect it sufficiently to make Congressional regulation necessary or appropriate. [25] This limitation, of course, is entirely distinct from the implied prohibition of the commerce clause.
Source: Wikisource

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