William Rehnquist

“ Apart from their reliance on the Gertz dictum, respondents do not really contend that a statement such as, "In my opinion John Jones is a liar," should be protected by a separate privilege for "opinion" under the First Amendment. But they do contend that in every defamation case the First Amendment mandates an inquiry into whether a statement is "opinion" or "fact," and that only the latter statements may be actionable. They propose that a number of factors developed by the lower courts (in what we hold was a mistaken reliance on the Gertz dictum) be considered in deciding which is which. ”

“ First, we held that the States could not impose liability without requiring some showing of fault. See id., at 347-348, 94 S.Ct., at 3010-3011 ("This approach . . . recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation") . Second, we held that the States could not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages on less than a showing of New York Times malice. ”

“ The destruction that defamatory falsehood can bring is, to be sure, often beyond the capacity of the law to redeem. Yet, imperfect though it is, an action for damages is the only hope for vindication or redress the law gives to a man whose reputation has been falsely dishonored. ”

“ The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. ”

“ See 418 U.S., at 350, 94 S.Ct., at 3012 ("Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship . . .") .
Still later, in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 89 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986) , we held that "the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern." ”

“ If you get in a jam, lie your way out.
" 'If you're successful enough, and powerful enough, and can sound sincere enough, you stand an excellent chance of making the lie stand up, regardless of what really happened.
" 'The teachers responsible were mainly head Maple wrestling coach, Mike Milkovich, and former superintendent of schools H. Donald Scott.
. . . . .
" 'Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer, knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth. ”

“ Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy. ”

“ New York Times, 376 U.S., at 270, 84 S.Ct., at 720. Thus, where a statement of "opinion" on a matter of public concern reasonably implies false and defamatory facts regarding public figures or officials, those individuals must show that such statements were made with knowledge of their false implications or with reckless disregard of their truth. Similarly, where such a statement involves a private figure on a matter of public concern, a plaintiff must show that the false connotations were made with some level of fault as required by Gertz. ”

“ Brief for Dow Jones et al. as Amici Curiae 27. We do not have the same certainty as do amici that people in a "small town" view statements such as these differently from people in a large city. Be that as it may, however, amici err in their factual assumption. Maple Heights is located in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and in the 1980 census had a population of 29,735. Mentor is located in Lake County, Ohio, and in the 1980 census had a population of 42,065. ”

“ Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1958, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S., at 284-286, 84 S.Ct., at 728-729) . "The question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law." ”

“ United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S.Ct. 17, 22, 63 L.Ed. 1173 (1919) (dissenting opinion) (" [T] he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-. . . the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market") .
Thus, we do not think this passage from Gertz was intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled "opinion." ”

“ Milkovich v. News-Herald, 46 Ohio App.3d 20, 21, 545 N.E.2d 1320, 1321-1322 (1989) . [2] Petitioner commenced a defamation action against respondents in the Court of Common Pleas of Lake County, Ohio, alleging that the headline of Diadiun's article and the nine passages quoted above "accused plaintiff of committing the crime of perjury, an indictable offense in the State of Ohio, and damaged plaintiff directly in his life-time occupation of coach and teacher, and constituted libel per se." App. 12. ”

“ News-Herald, 25 Ohio St.3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986) . First, respondents claim that the determination by the Ohio Supreme Court in Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St.3d 292, 298, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1196 (1984) , that petitioner is not a public official or figure was overruled in Scott. Thus, since petitioner has failed to establish actual malice, his action is precluded under New York Times Co. ”