Summary

Portrait of William Rehnquist William Rehnquist Sullivan v. Stroop — Opinion of the Court

Since the Secretary's interpretation of the § 602 (a) (8) (A) (vi) disregard incorporates the definition of "child support" that we find plain on the face of the statute, our statutory inquiry is at an end. The disregard, accordingly, does not admit of the interpretation advanced by respondents and accepted by both courts below. Though Title II child's insurance benefits might be characterized as "support" in the generic sense, they are not the sort of child support payments from absent parents envisioned in the Title IV scheme.
Source: Wikisource

Portrait of William Rehnquist William Rehnquist Sullivan v. Stroop — Opinion of the Court

The statute also makes plain that Congress meant for the Part D Child Support program to work in tandem with the AFDC program which constitutes Part A of Title IV, §§ 601-615. Section 602 (a) (27) requires state plans for AFDC participation to "provide that the State has in effect a plan approved under part D . . . and operates a child support program in substantial compliance with such plan."
Source: Wikisource

Portrait of William Rehnquist William Rehnquist Sullivan v. Stroop — Opinion of the Court

Section 602 (a) (26) requires State AFDC plans to
"provide that, as a condition of eligibility for [AFDC benefits] , each applicant or recipient will be required-
" (A) to assign the State any rights to support from any other person such applicant may have (i) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, . . . [and]
" (B) to cooperate with the State . . . (ii) in obtaining support payments for such applicant and for a child with respect to whom such aid is claimed. . . ."
Source: Wikisource

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