Emmanuel de Grouchy

“ GROUCHY, EMMANUEL, Marquis de (1766–1847) , marshal of France, was born in Paris on the 23rd of October 1766. He entered the French artillery in 1779, transferred to the cavalry in 1782, and to the Gardes du corps in 1786. In spite of his aristocratic birth and his connexions with the court, he was a convinced supporter of the principles of the Revolution, and had in consequence to leave the Guards. About the time of the outbreak of war in 1792 he became colonel of a cavalry regiment, and soon afterwards, as a maréchal de camp, he was sent to serve on the south-eastern frontier. ”

“ Gérard, Vandamme, Exelmans, felt that the Emperor was in the midst of a great battle, and with the instinct of soldiers urged that they should “March to the guns!” They pleaded with Grouchy to go, Gérard insisting with such temper that Grouchy’s precious self-love was pricked. In vain was all remonstrance; Grouchy would not move. He went to Wavre, fought the rear-guard which Blücher had left there to detain him, made himself as utterly useless to his chief as though he had not existed, and then, after Waterloo, fell back, in admirable order, to Namur. ”

“ And as he said this, he kicked the stone which Cousin Hans had seen him concealing, so that it rolled in upon the field of battle.
“Now or never,” thought Cousin Hans.
“Blücher!” he cried.
“Exactly!” answered the captain, “it’s the old werewolf Blücher, who comes marching upon the field with his Prussians.”
So Grouchy never came; there was Napoleon, deprived of his whole right wing, and facing 150,000 men. But with never failing coolness he gives his orders for a great change of front. ”

“ In 1796 came his first chance: after a brief period of service with the Army of the North in Holland he was once again at his old work under Hoche in the west, when the Directory determined to try to retaliate for the English participation in the Chouan revolt by raising a hornet's nest in Ireland. At the end of December a force of fifteen thousand men under Hoche, with Grouchy as second in command, set sail for Ireland. ”

“ Negative information in war is very often as useful and important as positive; and Grouchy would have assisted Napoleon to form his ideas if he had reported that he had discovered no signs of a Prussian retreat on Namur. He should also have made some mention of Pajol’s detachment—such as “no news has been received from Pajol, who is on my right at St Denis, with a detachment of cavalry and infantry.” Again, had Grouchy only accounted for 30,000 Prussians, of the whole of Blucher’s army? ”

“ The scattered remnants of Napoleon’s army were fleeing along the roads from Charleroi 142 towards Avesnes, Laon, and Phillippeville. Grouchy therefore designed his retreat so as to bring his army clear of pursuit as quickly as possible, and to work his way towards the fragments which were with difficulty being collected round Laon by Soult, Reille, and others. He hoped to reach Paris before the allied armies, in time to organise a defence, or perhaps to effect a junction with the army of the Alps under Suchet and with Lecourbe. ”

“ If there were good and sufficient reasons for not pursuing by night, there were none for the delay when day broke. Grouchy had been summoned to Napoleon’s headquarters at Fleurus at eleven o’clock at night, when he received orders to send the two Corps of cavalry under Pajol and Excelmans to pursue the enemy at daybreak. Grouchy then remained at Fleurus until 9 A.M., when he was ordered to accompany Napoleon on a tour of inspection of the battlefield! ”

“ Grouchy "must therefore move thither—in order to approach us, to put yourself within the sphere of our operations, and to keep up your communications with us, pushing before you those bodies of Prussians which have taken this direction and which may have stopped at Wavre, where you ought to arrive as soon as possible." Grouchy, however, was not to neglect Blücher's troops that were on his right, but must pick up their stragglers and keep up his communications with Napoleon. ”

“ At Fleurus Grouchy asked for definite orders, and received the brusque reply that he must wait. But now, towards 11 o'clock, the Emperor hears that Wellington is still at Quatre Bras, that Pajol has captured eight Prussian guns on the Namur road, and that Excelmans has seen masses of the enemy at Gembloux. At once he turns from politics to war.
His plan is formed. While he himself falls on the British, Grouchy is to pursue the Prussians with the corps of Gérard and Vandamme, the division of Teste (from Lobau's command) , and the cavalry corps of Pajol, Excelmans, and Milhaud. ”

“ But after all, such speculation as this might be continued indefinitely; and every campaign might be discussed and argued to a hundred different conclusions by re-modelling the conditions or improvising situations. A campaign, like a chess problem, admits of more than one solution.
12. Grouchy’s Retreat. Chapter VIII.—A few points concerning Grouchy’s retreat may be discussed briefly. Firstly, could he have been intercepted before he reached Namur? The answer is Yes, by Pirch I. Pirch had received orders, on the night of the 18th, to cut off Grouchy from the Sambre ”

“ For Grouchy should never have allowed it to be carried out. By efficient reconnoitring, such as was carried out by the Prussian Hussars, Grouchy should have discovered the threatened movement early in the morning of the 18th, and have sent Maurin’s Cavalry Division, followed by Excelmans’ Cavalry and Gérard’s Corps, to Moustier and Ottignies. The cavalry could have reached the bridges there in time to threaten Blucher’s flank, and prevent him, if not from assisting Wellington with a part of his forces, at least from throwing his whole weight into the battle against Napoleon. ”

“ As soon as he was out of the room, everyone complimented the Duchess on the interest she took in her servants. “But I only behave towards them as I like people to behave to me.” “That’s just it. They can say they’ve found a good place with you.” “Oh, nothing so very wonderful. But I think they all like me. That one is a little annoying because he’s in love. He thinks it incumbent on him to go about with a long face.”
At this point Poullein reappeared. “You’re quite right,” said M. de Grouchy, “he doesn’t look much like smiling. With those fellows one has to be good but not too good.” ”

“ A great many peasants in our country resemble him, and they are not the most stupid. He said not a word to us, and when he had passed the whole length of our line, all the generals and colonels were grouped together. The command was given to order arms. The orderlies then set off like the wind; this engrossed the attention of all, but not a man stirred. The rumor spread that Grouchy was to be commander-in-chief, and that the Emperor had attacked the English four leagues away, on the route to Brussels. ”

“ Fatigue showed itself again early on the morrow, when he declined to see Grouchy before 8 a.m. Yet his review of the troops and his long discussions on Parisian politics were clearly due, not to torpor, but to the belief that he had sundered the allies, and could occupy Brussels at will; for when he found out his mistake, he showed all the old energy, riding with the vanguard from Quatre Bras to La Belle Alliance through the violent rain. ”

“ Now, even if he had found that he was striking in a wrong direction, there can be no possible reason for his retreating to Le Mazy. He must have known that such a move, whether right or wrong, would have a very great influence on Grouchy’s plan; therefore, instead of marching all his forces back, he should have sent an aide-de-camp or galloper to find where the main body was, or to find Grouchy and get fresh instructions. ”

“ Sent out too late on a species of roving commission, more was expected from him by Napoleon than could have been accomplished by any but a leader of the highest order, whereas Grouchy had never given evidence of being more than respectable. He received from his master neither instructions nor information from the time he left the field of Ligny until 4 P.M. of the 18th, nor until at Walhain he heard the cannonade of Waterloo had he any knowledge of the whereabouts of the French main army. On the morning of the 18th he was late in leaving Gembloux, on not the most direct route towards Wavre ”

“ We do not so regard the matter. To our mind, the terms in which Napoleon has, in the extract given above, framed what he says was the order which he sent to Grouchy, simply express the expectations formed in his own mind of what Grouchy would do, when, after having received the Bertrand order, he found that Blücher had fallen back towards the English. We think the orders sent to Ney on the afternoon of the battle of Ligny should serve as a guide to us here. We do not believe that Napoleon sent to Grouchy any such order as that which he gives in his Memoirs ”

“ Unfortunately for Napoleon and Grouchy, the exigencies of the campaign forced the Emperor to divide his army; so, while entrusting Ney with a part of his troops, with orders to pursue the English, and keeping the Guard and reserves [312] under his immediate control, he gave Grouchy the command of two corps of infantry and one of cavalry; in all, some thirty-three thousand men. ”

“ But Charras648 thinks that the movement to Moustier would have been at once perceived by Ledebur’s cavalry, and that Grouchy would probably, on arriving at Moustier and Ottignies, have found himself in face of 40,000 men and 150 pieces of cannon, in position behind the Dyle, and that it could only have been by a very unlikely concurrence of circumstances that Grouchy could have seized these bridges before the Prussians would have been in sufficient force to oppose him. ”

“ Grouchy cannot have under him above twenty or five-and-twenty thousand soldiers, at the utmost. Had he possessed a greater force, he might have covered the retreat, and the Emperor would still have been in command of an army on the frontiers. Not a man of the guard will ever rally more. I myself commanded them; I myself witnessed their total extermination, ere I left the field of battle: they are annihilated. The enemy are at Nivelles with eighty thousand men; they may, if they please, be at Paris in six days. There is no safety for France, but in instant propositions for peace [102] . ”

“ Grouchy failed, partly because he was insufficiently provided with cavalry, partly because he was a man excellent only in a sudden tactical dilemma, incompetent in large strategical problems, partly because he mistrusted his [Pg 137] subordinates, and they him; but most of all because of an original prepossession (under which, it is but fair to him to add, all the French leaders lay) that the Prussian retreat had taken the form of a flight towards Namur, along the eastern line of communications, while, as a fact, it had taken the form of a disciplined retreat upon Wavre and the north. ”

“ Secondly, “They (the Prussians) were still here at ten o’clock this morning.” The Emperor would at once conclude that the enemy had left soon after ten o’clock; he certainly would suppose that Grouchy would have found out if they had remained there later. Actually, the Prussians left at 2 P.M., four hours later. Thirdly, “He (Blucher) has not passed by Gembloux.” Napoleon would suppose (since Grouchy had been instructed to keep touch with the left wing) that traces of Blucher and his main body had been searched for between the line of Grouchy’s march and the main French army. ”

“ Finding Senlis too strongly held, d’Erlon withdrew, and made his way towards Gonesse, while Reille took part of his force to Nanteuil. Night put an end to pursuit.
Thus at the close of the 27th, all the bridges over the Oise were in Blucher’s hands, and there seemed every prospect of Grouchy’s forces being cut off from Paris. The French had now three separate columns in retreat, and there was a great danger of two of these being cut off.
On the 28th, long before dawn, the Second Division of Zieten’s Corps approached Villets Coterets, where Grouchy had his headquarters. ”

“ He’ll have nothing to do all day but call for your pheasants, sit in 244the house doing nothing and eat his share of them.” “There are plenty of people who would be glad to be in his place,” said M. de Grouchy, for envy makes men blind.
“Oriane,” began the Princesse de Parme, “I had a visit the other day from your cousin Heudicourt; of course she’s a highly intelligent woman; she’s a Guermantes, one can say no more, but they tell me she has a spiteful tongue.” The Duke fastened on his wife a slow gaze of deliberate stupefaction. Mme. de Guermantes began to smile. ”

“ Now, a force in retreat does not require an equivalent force to pursue it. The moral advantages with the victor enable him to press vigorously with fewer troops. So the force detached 78 under Grouchy (33,600 men) was ample to follow up the Prussians, and to beat even the fresh Corps (Bulow’s) which Napoleon suspected in the vicinity of Gembloux. True, Grouchy’s force was required to do something more than follow up and beat Thielemann’s Corps, or Thielemann’s and Bulow’s combined: but what could be Napoleon’s object in keeping back any troops at Ligny? ”

“ The day was now drawing to a close, and Ney decided wisely not to push his advance any farther. He was in front of a force of unknown strength which appeared resolved to stand its ground, his men were tired, and the cannon-thunder to his right rear proclaimed clearly that Grouchy had not made much headway on the Fleurus road. To push on farther might isolate the left wing among a host of allies. He therefore halted his command, and, later, made a report to the emperor. ”