Archibald Frank Becke

“ But hardly had the Young and Middle Guard marched off to reinforce Vandamme and Gérard, when Vandamme sent word that a hostile column, over 30,000 strong, was threatening the French left (in reality this was D’Erlon’s corps) . Vandamme’s exhausted troops were unnerved at the sight of this fresh foe, and an incipient panic was only quelled by turning guns on the fugitives. It was now between 5.30 and 6. The emperor concluded that this could not be D’Erlon, because he had arrived too soon and was marching in an evidently wrong direction. He at once sent an officer to reconnoitre. ”

“ Massing every available man he led the attack in person; but he vainly attempted to make ground to the south of S. Amand; the exhausted Prussians were overpowered by the chasseurs of the Guard and forced to retire in disorder. Napoleon’s opportunity to finish the battle had come at last. He could at least beat Blücher and render the Prussians unfit for any serious operation except retreat on June 17, although he could no longer expect to destroy the Prussian army. Lobau’s corps, too, was now arriving and forming up on the heights east of Fleurus. ”

“ The day was now drawing to a close, and Ney decided wisely not to push his advance any farther. He was in front of a force of unknown strength which appeared resolved to stand its ground, his men were tired, and the cannon-thunder to his right rear proclaimed clearly that Grouchy had not made much headway on the Fleurus road. To push on farther might isolate the left wing among a host of allies. He therefore halted his command, and, later, made a report to the emperor. ”

“ The allies had foreseen the very manœuvre that Napoleon designed to put into execution, and had decided that if an attempt were made to break their centre they would concentrate forwards and on their inner flanks, the Anglo-Dutch army forming up at Gosselies and the Prussians at Fleurus. ”

“ Probably Wellington's failure to co-operate at Ligny had heightened the Prussian chief-of-staff's unworthy suspicions of the good faith and soldierly qualifications of the British marshal; and it was well for the allies that Blücher was able to resume command before Napoleon had time to profit from the dissensions that would probably have arisen had Gneisenau remained in control. The casualties in the hard-fought battle of Ligny were very heavy. The Prussians lost about 12,000 men and 21 guns, and the French 8500; in Ligny more than 4000 dead lay on an area of about 400 sq. ”

“ By the emperor’s arrangements Vandamme, Gérard, Pajol and Exelmans would be available after 2 p.m. to attack whatever force Blücher might command, and the Guard and Milhaud would be at hand to act as reserve. The wonder is that he did not now order Lobau to move to some intermediate position, such as Wangenies, where he would be available for either wing as circumstances dictated. At 2 p.m. Napoleon ordered Ney to master Quatre Bras, and added that the emperor would attack the corps which he saw in front of him. Whichever wing succeeded first would then wheel inwards and help the other. ”

“ Napoleon, therefore, had to free his right flank before he could make use of Ney’s capture. To this end he sent two battalions of the Old Guard to storm Plancenoit. The veterans did the work magnificently with the bayonet, ousted the Prussians from the place, and drove them back 600 yards beyond it. But Napoleon could not turn now on Wellington. Zieten was fast coming up on the duke’s left, and the crisis was past. Zieten’s advent permitted the two fresh cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur on the duke’s extreme left to be moved and posted behind the depleted centre. ”

“ Although the emperor wrote to Ney again at noon, from Ligny, that troops had now been placed in position at Marbais to second the marshal's attack on Quatre Bras, yet Ney remained quiescent, and Wellington effected so rapid and skilful a retreat that, on Napoleon's arrival at the head of his supporting corps, be found only the duke's cavalry screen and some horse artillery still in position. Can we wonder that he gave vent to his anger Napoleon's pursuit of Wellington and declared that Ney had ruined France? ”

“ The Dutch-Belgian troops to the east of the Brussels highway were at once forced back by the mass of men moved against them, and it looked as if the whole defence would crumple up. But about 3 p.m. timely succour reached the field—Van Merlen's cavalry from Nivelles, Picton and the 5th division from Brussels—and Wellington returned and took over the command. Picton at once stopped the victorious French advance to the east of the road, but the remaining division (Jérôme) of Reille's corps now reached the front and Ney flung it into the Bossu wood to clear that place and keep his left flank free. ”

“ Blücher, based on Napoleon's plans. the Rhine at Coblentz, held the eastern half from the Brussels-Charleroi road to the Meuse, and had his headquarters at Namur. The emperor was convinced that nothing could be gained by invading Belgium from the S.E. or W.; such a stroke would surely drive the allies together, and that was never Napoleon's custom. On the other hand, if he struck straight at Charleroi—the allied junction point—he would drive the “Armée du Nord” like an armoured wedge between the allies, if only he caught them unsuspicious and unready. ”

“ The lateness of the hour at which the attack was delivered, and the emperor's determination to break Wellington's centre instead of outflanking the Anglo-Dutch left and further separating the allies, deprived him of whatever chance he still possessed of beating Wellington before Blücher could intervene. Napoleon drew up his army of 74,000 men and 246 guns in three lines, fully in view of the allies. In the first line were the corps of Reille and D'Erlon, who were destined to attack the allied line and prepare it for the final assault. ”

“ Wellington's subordinates at the critical point, however, acted with admirable boldness. Prince Bernard, in command of a brigade at Quatre Bras and Frasnes, recognizing the pressing danger that threatened on the Brussels road, retained his position there to check the French advance, instead of drawing off westwards and massing with the rest of his division at Nivelles; and in this action he was firmly supported by his immediate superiors. It was due to their presence of mind that Wellington maintained his hold on the important strategical point of Quatre Bras on June 15 and 16. ”

“ It was accordingly arranged that Wellington and Blücher should await in Belgium the arrival of the Austrian and Russian masses on the Rhine, about July 1, before the general invasion of France was begun. Thereafter, whatever befell, the allied armies would resolutely press forward towards Paris, affording each other mutual support, and with the tremendous weight of troops at their disposal thrust back Napoleon upon his capital, force him to fight in front of it, and drive him when defeated within its works. ”

“ The main position was very skilfully taken up, and care was taken to distribute the troops so that the indifferent and immature were closely supported by those who were “better disciplined and more accustomed to war.” Owing to a misconception, one Dutch-Belgian brigade formed up in front of the ridge. Full arrangements were made for Blücher's co-operation through General Müffling, the Prussian attaché on the duke's staff. The duke was to stand fast to receive the attack, whilst the Prussians should close round Napoleon's exposed right and support Wellington's left. ”

“ Napoleon now pondered over his plan of campaign. In Belgium, across an almost open frontier, lay an ever-increasing force of Anglo-Dutch and Prussian troops under Wellington and Blücher. The Rhine frontier was threatened by Schwarzenberg's Austrians (210,000) ; Barclay de Tolly's Russians (150,000) were slowly coming up; and another Austrian force menaced the S.E. frontier of France. The allies determined that they would wage a war without risks, and they were particularly anxious to avoid the risk of defeat in detail. ”

“ The whole 80 squadrons resumed the attack, but with no better result. The cavalry gradually became hopelessly entangled among the squares they were unable to break, and at last they were driven down the face of the ridge and the most dramatic part of the battle came to an end. Had these great cavalry attacks been closely supported by infantry, there can be little doubt that they must have achieved their object. But they were not. In his handling of the three arms together, Napoleon on this day failed to do justice to his reputation.
About 4.30 p.m. Bülow at last engaged. ”

“ It had already reached the edge of the Ligny battlefield when the counter-order arrived, and conceiving, that he was still under Marshal Ney (for the officer who bore the pencil-note directing Ney to detach D’Erlon, had on his own initiative ordered the I. Corps to the eastward) the general considered he ought to return to the left wing, and leaving one division at Wagnelée he withdrew his force. The incident was immeasurably unfortunate for the French. Had the I. Corps been thrown into the doubtful struggle at Quatre Bras, it must have crushed Wellington ”

“ To gain the best chance of success he would have to concentrate his whole army almost within gunshot of the centre of the enemies' outposts without attracting their attention; otherwise he would find the allies concentrated and waiting for him.
Wellington and Blücher were disposed as follows in the early days of June (Map I) . The Anglo-Dutch army of 93,000 with headquarters at Brussels were cantoned: I. Corps (Prince of Orange) , 30,200, headquarters Braine-le-Comte, disposed in the area Enghien-Genappe-Mons ”

“ The other is to be used exclusively to neutralize the other enemy, by holding him at bay.
Napoleon’s original plan for the 16th was based on the assumption that the allies, who had been caught napping, would not attempt a risky forward concentration; and he intended therefore to push an advanced guard as far as Gembloux, for the purpose of feeling for and warding off Blücher. To assist this operation the reserve would move at first to Fleurus to reinforce Grouchy, should he need assistance in driving back Blücher’s troops ”