Summary

Byron White Toussie v. United States — Dissent

But the presumption is by its nature rebuttable; if it is ever to give way, it must surely do so in a case such as this where every other guide to statutory interpretation points to a contrary legislative intent. To hold otherwise-to erect as the majority does an absolute bar to finding a continuing offense in the absence of express statutory language is to shirk our judicial responsibility of interpreting Acts of Congress as they come to us, without insisting that Congress make our task easier by using some particular form of words to express its intent.
Source: Wikisource

Byron White Toussie v. United States — Dissent

It is at once clear that nothing is gained by stressing that the general statute of limitations applies ' (e) xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law.' The question in this case is not whether the five-year statute applies, but when it begins to run. That question in turn depends on what the 'offense' is for which petitioner is being tried, and when it was that he committed that offense. In the typical case, an offense if complete as soon as every element in the crime occurs, and the statute of limitations begins to run from that date.
Source: Wikisource

Byron White Toussie v. United States — Dissent

There is not the slightest suggestion that Congress suspected, that the registration and liability provisions of §§ 453 and 454 interrelated provisions which must fairly be read in pari materia ever created anything other than continuing duties until the specified 26-year age limit was reached.↑ Petitioner has suggested that if the duty to register is continuing, there is no logical stopping place for bounding the duty, so that 'a person seventy years old can be prosecuted for having failed to register fifty-two years before at the age of eighteen.' Brief for Petitioner 17.
Source: Wikisource

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