“ Finally, EPA correctly noted that requiring significant reductions in CO2 emissions from cars and light trucks has the effect of making fuel economy standards more stringent, but Congress has reserved fuel economy regulation to the Department of Transportation. Since there is such a close correlation between motor vehicle CO2 emissions and fuel economy, EPA properly decided that this is yet another important reason why it would be inappropriate to set CO2 standards for cars and light trucks under the CAA. For all of these reasons, the petitions for review should be denied. ”

“ In their brief to this Court, Petitioners have not contested any of EPA's factual conclusions regarding the availability of control technologies, nor have they identified any aspect of the administrative record pertaining to these issues that they believe EPA overlooked. Instead they argue that the availability of appropriate control technology is simply irrelevant to the question of whether endangerment exists, and that consideration of such factors is not lawful in deciding whether to make an endangerment finding. ”

“ EPA noted that the only provisions of the Act that specifically mention CO2 or “global warming” are non-regulatory in nature, and pointed out that when Congress previously wanted to address an analogous type of global environmental issue — stratospheric ozone depletion — it added an entirely new set of provisions to the Act specifically tailored to that problem and its international dimensions. Id. at 52,926-27. EPA also explained that a key regulatory mechanism authorized by the CAA (the NAAQS system) is ill-suited to addressing global problems such as climate change. ”

“ The potential regulation of CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions is at least as “extraordinary” a case as is the potential regulation of tobacco. See 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,928. While the Supreme Court was influenced in Brown & Williamson by its view that the tobacco industry “constitut [es] a significant portion of the American economy,” 529 U.S. at 159, tobacco nonetheless is one of many American industries. ”

“ EPA also identified numerous initiatives that are now underway to help develop more advanced and commercially viable motor vehicle and stationary source technology that would help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. ”

“ By contrast, “the remarks of a single legislator, even the sponsor,” are said to be the least persuasive. United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1090-91 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted) .
In fact, none of the legislative history of the 1970 CAA amendments directly explains why Congress added “climate” to the welfare effects definition, nor does any of the legislative history reflect any congressional consideration of the effect that such a change was intended to have on the scope of regulation of motor vehicle emissions, which was the specific topic raised by the ICTA Petition. ”

“ The Court therefore ruled that the FDA could not rely on an “implicit delegation” of rulemaking authority in the FDCA where it was clear that Congress had intended to preclude such authority. Id. at 159-61. We also note that the Supreme Court reached the result it did in Brown & Williamson despite the fact that the Supreme Court openly acknowledged at the very outset of its opinion that the “case involves one of the most troubling public health problems facing our Nation today: the thousands of premature deaths that occur each year because of tobacco use.” ”

“ Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that Petitioners have adequately alleged an injury in fact, Petitioners have not adequately demonstrated that any such injury was caused by EPA's decision not to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from mobile sources, or, similarly, that their alleged injury can be redressed by a decision in their favor by this Court. With regard to causation and redressability, Petitioners refer the Court to paragraphs 20-32 of the declaration of Michael MacCracken and paragraphs 10-12 of the declaration of Michael Walsh. ”

“ If anything, Senator Boggs' insertion of Chapter 4 of the CEQ Report into the legislative record reinforces the above conclusions. While Chapter 4 of the CEQ Report (which was entitled “Air Pollution”) briefly mentioned the climate issue, see CEQ Report at 71, it was focused on emissions of carbon monoxide, particulate matter, sulfur oxides, hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, and oxidants — not CO2 or other greenhouse gases. ”

“ And in 1990 — one day after the CAA Amendments of 1990 were signed into law — Congress established a Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences to coordinate a 10-year research program on climate change. ”

“ Instead, “ [a] sensible regulatory scheme would require that all significant sources and sinks of [greenhouse gas] emissions be considered in deciding how best to achieve any needed emission reductions.” Id. In this regard, while Petitioners purport to be limiting their challenges in this case to the mobile source context, we note that most of their policy arguments are based on the harms allegedly caused by greenhouse gas emissions in general, not emissions that are specific to mobile sources. ”

“ NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478, 483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (dissenting opinion of D.H. Ginsburg, J.) (to demonstrate redressability in a challenge to the stringency of fuel economy standards, petitioners must allege that the marginal impact of an increase in greenhouse gas emissions that may be attributed to less stringent standards may create a serious environmental harm) . ”

“ The Court's decision in National Public Radio involved the interpretation of a highly specific statutory provision pertaining to the equally specific question of when “noncommercial educational entities” can be exempted from participating in auctions for broadcast licenses. ”

“ While the NAAQS provisions focus on criteria pollutants, other sections of the CAA address air pollutants meeting other specifications. Section 112 provides for regulation of “hazardous air pollutants.” See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (b) (2) . Title IV of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o, creates a regulatory regime to significantly reduce the precursors of acid rain, and Title VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671q, establishes a comprehensive regulatory program to protect stratospheric ozone, which helps shield the Earth from harmful ultraviolet radiation. ”

“ See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160 (explaining that it is “highly unlikely” that Congress would “leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, [regulated] ” to the agency's construction of a single term in a statute) (quoting MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) ) .
16/ On this point, the Senate Report in fact stressed that even under the proposed amendments to the Act's mobile source provisions, “ [t] he regulatory authority in section 202 (a) would be essentially the same as existing law,” except for certain new procedural requirements. ”

“ Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845 (1986) (agency's expertise is due substantial deference when deciding issues that bear on its jurisdiction) . Chevron step two deference is especially appropriate where, as here, an agency is disclaiming authority. National Wildlife Fed'n v. ICC, 850 F.2d 694, 699 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Since the Commission disclaims rather than asserts a power, there is all the more reason to feel assured of its disinterestedness and to resolve ambiguity in favor of its choice of construction.") ”

“ In reaching this conclusion, EPA took note of the numerous technical comments it had received, and ultimately relied most heavily on the 2001 report of the National Academy of Sciences' National Research Council (“NRC Report”) discussed above. Id. at 52,930; see NRC Report (JA 679) . As EPA explained, the NRC advised that “' [b] ecause of the large and still uncertain level of natural variability inherent in the climate record and the uncertainties in the time histories of the various forcing agents . . ”

“ Reg. at 52,929.
30/ EPA explained, and Petitioners do not dispute, that “ [n] o technology currently exists or is under development that can capture and destroy or reduce emissions of CO2, unlike other emissions from motor vehicle tailpipes.” 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,929.
In arguing that EPCA does not expressly abrogate EPA’s authority under the CAA, see Pet. Br. at 38-43, Petitioners ignore those EPCA provisions that clearly signal Congress’ intent that regulation of motor vehicle fuel economy be governed by EPCA alone. ”

“ S. 1323 (102nd Cong.) (introduced June 19, 1991) (amending the CAA to establish a permitting and credit offset program for sources of CO2 emissions) ; S. 2668 (102nd Cong.) (introduced May 7, 1992) (requiring regulations to achieve stabilization of CO2 emissions by January 1, 2000) ; S. 2617 (105th Cong.) (introduced Oct. 10, 1998) (amending CAA to authorize regulatory credits for voluntary reductions in greenhouse gas emissions) ; H.R. 2520 (106th Cong.) (introduced July 14, 1999) (authorizing regulatory credits for voluntary reductions in greenhouse gas emissions) ”