“ When Congress made outright grants to a railroad of alternate sections of public lands along the right of way, there is little reason to suppose that it intended to give only an easement in the right of way granted in the same act. And, in none of those acts was there any provision comparable to that of Section 4 of the 1875 Act that 'lands over which such right of way shall pass shall be disposed of subject to such right of way'. None of the cases involved the problem of rights to subsurface oil and minerals. ”

“ Section 2 adds to the conclusion that the right granted is one of use and occupancy only, rather than the land itself, for it declares that any railroad whose right of way passes through a canyon, pass or defile 'shall not prevent any other railroad company from the use and occupancy of said cayon, pass, or defile, for the purposes of its road, in common with the road first located'. ”

“ The conclusion that the railroad was the owner of a 'limited fee' was based on cases arising under the land-grant acts passed prior to 1871 and it does not appear that Congress' change of policy after 1871 was brought to the Court's attention. [20] That conclusion is inconsistent with the language of the Act, its legislative history, its early administrative interpretation and the construction placed on it by Congress in subsequent legislation. We therefore do not regard it as controlling. ”