Harry Blackmun

“ The District Court relied first on § 210 (g) , which provides that "Subsection (a) of this section [the prohibition on employer retaliation] shall not apply" where an employee "deliberately causes a violation of any requirement of this Act or of the Atomic Energy Act." According to the District Court and respondent, this section reflects a congressional desire to preclude all relief, including state remedies, to a whistle-blower who deliberately commits a safety violation referred to in § 210 (g) . ”

“ Potential liability for the kind of claim at issue in Silkwood will affect radiological safety decisions more directly than will potential liability under the kind of claim petitioner raises, because the tort claim in Silkwood attaches additional consequences to safety violations themselves, rather than to employer conduct that merely arises from allegations of safety violations. ”

“ We recognize that the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress at issue here may have some effect on these decisions, because liability for claims like petitioner's will attach additional consequences to retaliatory conduct by employers. As employers find retaliation more costly, they will be forced to deal with complaints by whistle-blowers by other means, including altering radiological safety policies. Nevertheless, we believe that this effect is neither direct nor substantial enough to place petitioner's claim in the pre-empted field. ”

“ We simply cannot believe that Congress intended that result. Instead, we think the District Court was essentially correct in observing that while § 210 obviously bears some relation to the field of nuclear safety, its "paramount" purpose was the protection of employees. [6] See 683 F.Supp., at 1013. Accordingly, we see no basis for respondent's contention that all state-law claims arising from conduct covered by the section are necessarily included in the pre-empted field. Nor, however, can we accept petitioner's position, or the reading of Pacific Gas on which it is based. ”

“ This approach to defining the field had some support in the text of the 1959 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, which provided, among other things, that " [n] othing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards." ”

“ The Court has observed: "Undoubtedly, every subject that merits congressional legislation is, by definition, a subject of national concern. That cannot mean, however, that every federal statute ousts all related state law. . . . Instead, we must look for special features warranting pre-emption." Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2378, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) . Here, the District Court identified three "special features" of § 210 that it believed were incompatible with petitioner's claim. ”