Portal:Supreme Court of the United States

“ Similarly, Ford and Panetti stated that it “offends humanity” to execute a person so wracked by mental illness that he cannot comprehend the “meaning and purpose of the punishment.” 477 U. S., at 407; 551 U. S., at 960; see id., at 958. But that offense to morality must be much less when a person’s mental disorder causes nothing more than an episodic memory loss. Moral values do not exempt the simply forgetful from punishment, whatever the neurological reason for their lack of recall.
But such memory loss still may factor into the “rational understanding” analysis that Panetti demands. ”

“ But even if that were so, it is hard to see what that would have to do with the question whether the state court thought that dementia could not satisfy the Ford/Panetti test. And in any event, the Court does not fairly describe the State’s argument in the Eleventh Circuit. The State’s Eleventh Circuit brief argued that merely suffering from a mental condition like dementia is not enough to render a prisoner incompetent to be executed; instead, the prisoner must also establish that he lacks a rational understanding of the reason for his execution. ”

“ The issue whether a State may administer the death penalty to a person whose disability leaves him without memory of his commission of a capital offense is a substantial question not yet addressed by the Court. ”

“ Even if it were proper for us to consider whether the order below was based on an erroneous distinction between dementia and other mental conditions, there is little reason to think that it was. After a full evidentiary hearing in 2016, the state court rejected petitioner’s Ford/Panetti claim based on a correct statement of the holding of those decisions. It found that petitioner “ha [d] not carried his burden [of showing] by a preponderance of the evidence... that he... does not rationally understand the punishment he is about to suffer and why he is about to suffer it.” ”

“ Yet, as the State’s brief and oral argument illustrate, the State’s core contention was that the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established law under Panetti’s “very narrow” holding. (And as we later held in Dunn, the State was correct.) The majority simply cannot escape the inconvenient fact that the State never argued, as a non-AEDPA matter, that petitioner could be executed even if his dementia precluded a rational understanding. ”

“ If that loss combines and interacts with other mental shortfalls to deprive a person of the capacity to comprehend why the State is exacting death as punishment, then the Panetti standard will be satisfied. ”

“ Code §15–16–23 (2011) (allowing a stay of execution “on account of the [convict’s] insanity”) . But even if so, that does not advance the State’s view that the state court properly understood the Eighth Amendment bar when assessing Madison’s competency. Alabama told this Court in opposing certiorari that its statute covers only those with delusional disorders, and not those with dementia. See Brief in Opposition 12 (“ [T] he sole question to be answered under the state statute was whether Madison was insane, not whether he suffered from dementia”) . ”

“ But we made clear that our decision was premised on AEDPA’s “demanding” and “deferential standard.” Id., at___, ___ (slip op., at 3, 4) . “We express [ed] no view” on the question of Madison’s competency “outside of the AEDPA context.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 4) . [1]
When Alabama set an execution date in 2018, Madison returned to state court to argue again that his mental condition precluded the State from going forward. In his petition, Madison reiterated the facts and arguments he had previously presented to the state court. ”

“ Ford and Panetti because he “does not suffer from psychosis or delusions”) ; Tr. 82 (“The Supreme Court [in Panetti] is looking at whether someone’s delusions or someone’s paranoia or someone’s psychosis is standing in the way of ” rationally understanding his punishment) ; see also supra, at 4–5; but see post, at 9–10, and n. 4 (disregarding those arguments) . And Alabama relied on the expert opinion of a psychologist who highlighted Madison’s lack of “psychosis, paranoia, or delusion,” while never mentioning his dementia. ”

“ See Madison, 851 F. 3d, at 1188 (describing Alabama’s argument that “only a prisoner suffering from gross delusions can show incompetency under Panetti”) ; Recording of Oral Arg. in No. 16–12279 (CA11, June 23, 2016) , at 26:36–26:45 (“In this case, what we have is someone who claims to have a mental illness, dementia,” but does not have “delusions, which is what Panetti requires”) ; id., at 26:48–27:21 (When asked if someone with “severe dementia” but no delusions could be executed, the State responded “I think so because... they don’t have delusions”) . ”

“ In the past when counsel have done this, we have dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. See, e. g., Visa, Inc. v. Osborn, 580 U. S. ___ (2016) ; City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. ___ (2015) . We should do that here. ”

“ Clark, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 9) (remanding when “uncertain” whether “an impermissible taint occurred”) ; Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 751–752 (1990) (similar) . In that proceeding, two matters disputed below should now be clear. ”

“ Id., at 22–23. “Mr. Madison’s severe memory impairments as a result of vascular dementia render him incompetent to be executed under the Eight Amendment.” Id., at 25 (quotation altered) . In sum, the body of the petition makes it clear that review was sought on the question invited by the Dunn concurrence, and the thrust of the wording of the two questions was the same. They read as follows:
“1. ”