Ronald M. Gould

“ On April 19, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against Sweetwater alleging unlawful sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”) , see 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [4] They alleged that Sweetwater “intentionally discriminated” against female students at Castle Park High School (“Castle Park”) by “unlawfully fail [ing] to provide female student athletes equal treatment and benefits as compared to male athletes.” ”

“ The district court gave summary judgment to Plaintiffs on their unequal participation claim in March 2009. See Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 604 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (S.D. Cal. 2009) . The court found that “substantial proportionality requires a close relationship between athletic participation and enrollment,” and concluded that Sweetwater had not shown such a “close relationship” because it “fail [ed] to provide female students with opportunities to participate in athletics in substantially proportionate numbers as males.” ”

“ Schiff and Parker based their proposed testimony on superficial inspections of the Castle Park facilities. Even if a visual walkthrough, without more, could be enough in some cases to render expert testimony admissible under Rule 702, it certainly does not compel that conclusion in all cases. Moreover, as the district court found, Schiff and Parker’s conclusions were based on their “personal opinions and speculation rather than on a systematic assessment of [Castle Park’s] athletic facilities and programs.” ”

“ With their softball coach fired, Plaintiffs’ prospects for competing were hampered. Stated another way, Plaintiffs’ Title IX retaliation claim seeks to vindicate not Coach Martinez’s rights, but Plaintiffs’ own rights. Because Plaintiffs were asserting their own “legal rights and interests,” not a claim of their coach, the generally strict limitations on third-party standing do not bar their claim. ”

“ Sweetwater contends, in essence, that it complied with Rule 26 because Plaintiffs knew of the contested witnesses’ existence.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Sweetwater’s argument. The theory of disclosure under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to encourage parties to try cases on the merits, not by surprise, and not by ambush. ”

“ Title IX—indeed, students are the statute’s very focus.
Coach Martinez gave softball players extra practice time and individualized attention, persuaded volunteer coaches to help with specialized skills, and arranged for the team to play in tournaments attended by college recruiters. The softball team was stronger with Coach Martinez than without him. After Coach Martinez was fired, Sweetwater stripped the softball team of its voluntary assistant coaches, canceled the team’s 2007 awards banquet, and forbade the team from participating in a Las Vegas tournament attended by college recruiters. ”

“ Sweetwater contends that while Coach Martinez would have had standing to bring a Title IX retaliation claim himself, the “third party” students cannot “maintain a valid cause of action for retaliation under Title IX for their coach’s protected activity and the adverse employment action taken against the coach.”
We reject this argument. It misunderstands Plaintiffs’ claim, which asserts that Sweetwater impermissibly retaliated against them by firing Coach Martinez in response to Title IX complaints he made on Plaintiffs’ behalf. ”

“ Sweetwater’s arguments are either factually wrong or without legal support. First, Title IX plaintiffs need not themselves gauge interest in any particular sport. It is the school district that should evaluate student interest “periodically” to “identify in a timely and responsive manner any developing interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex.” 1996 Clarification. Second, field hockey is a CIF-approved sport. ”

“ Id. at 560–61 (alteration, ellipsis, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted) . [15] “In a class action, standing is satisfied if at least one named plaintiff meets the requirements.” Bates v. ”