Rudolf Hermann Lotze

“ It will be objected, further, that a law appears even much less capable than a quality, of that reality which must appertain to every ‘Thing.’ This objection we might obviate, in so far as it is undoubtedly self-evident that, wherever we design to define in thought the essence of ‘Thing’ the thought-image by means of which we make the attempt, must remain as a mere image distinct from the real Thing. Moreover, we can in no case give such an expression to our thought of the essence of ‘Thing’ as would be the real Thing itself, and not merely a designation for our cognition. ”

“ In opposition to the foregoing mode of apprehending the subject, philosophy is wont with great vivacity to explain: ‘Standing in relations’ can be asserted only of that which exists previous to such relations. Accordingly, the ‘Being’ of things can consist neither in their relation to us, nor in their relation to one another; it must rather be thought of as a perfectly pure and simple ‘position,’ ‘affirmation,’ or ‘putting,’ which excludes all relations, but forms the ground of the possibility of becoming related at all. ”

“ We can therefore merely form the general notion of ‘quality’ in such a way as to lead us to seek further for the universal factor of all sensible qualities. Now since the classes of these qualities are altogether disparate,—warm and sweet, for example, having no common element in their content,—such universal factor lies solely in the form which our representation gives to them all. ”

“ Now as long as a and b have the value of beings independent of each other and self-subsisting,—no matter how similar, comparable, or related their natures may otherwise be,—so long is the above assumption without a reason for its possibility: the states of a have nothing to do with b, and conversely. All the pains-taking, however, to bring these ‘Things’ which are of themselves quite isolated, into some relation in a supplementary way, by means of ideas of the ‘passing-over’ of some influence, have been shown to be perfectly fruitless. ”

“ For if we actually exclude all relations, then the ‘pure Being’ would consist in a mere ‘position’; by virtue of which, however, that which is thus existent cannot be discovered at any place in the world, or at any point of time in the succession of events, and does not assert itself in actuality by any effect upon anything whatever, and cannot be affected at all by any element of actuality. ”

“ The conception of efficient causation is inevitable for our apprehension of the World, and all attempts to deny the reality of efficient causation, and then still comprehend the course of the world, make shipwreck of themselves. ”

“ The peculiar deficiency which prevents ‘Quality’ from being the essence of a ‘Thing’ consists in its simplicity. Because of this simplicity, quality, on the one hand, furnishes no inner principle of limitation, and never forms a whole; and, on the other hand, it can only exist or not exist, but can never during its existence be the subject of states of any kind. ”

“ An actual ‘absolute Becoming’ would be taught only by such a theory as should assert that the actuality itself (not merely the phenomenon of an actual being) changes so that, in the place of one actual being which disappears, there comes another newly originated, without the conveyance of any reality, common to both and serving as the common subject of their content, from the first being over into this second. ”

“ In actuality there is, from the very beginning onward, nothing but just these individually limited and definite qualities, from which only we, by our comparative thinking, subsequently form the abstraction of a universal, unmoulded ‘Quality.’ And it is precisely the aforesaid limited qualities that are the things themselves. ”

“ Warmth per se does not change into cold per se; but only so far as the two are states of the same body, or of two bodies in contact, does the nature of these bodies carry along with it the impossibility of both states occurring together. ‘Cold’ is not in this way made ‘warm’; but in a particular body the state of being cold is replaced by that of being warm. So that all action and reaction here depends upon the yet unknown nature of the real subject, and, on the contrary, only appears to take place between the simple qualities in themselves. ”

“ In order to elucidate in some degree the meaning of our previous very abstract reflections by a concrete example, let us call to mind an idea which we very ordinarily are wont to have of the essence of the ‘soul.’ Since we only have to do with elucidation, it is left altogether undecided whether this idea is of itself perfectly correct, or whether it, like perhaps our own result as thus far reached, stands in need of a further correction. ”

“ Thus the conception of ‘positing’ is not applicable at all, if it is designed, without media, to posit merely something, and yet not posit it anywhere whatever. Thus, moreover, we cannot ‘affirm’ a Thing, but only a predicate of a thing.
‘Pure Being,’ thus apprehended, would therefore be only the conception of an affirmation, to which must be supplied both the subject of which the affirmation is supposed to hold good, and the predicate which is supposed to attach itself to the subject. ”

“ We are obviously obliged to require a certain ‘unity’ of the nature of ‘Thing.’ Just such unity, however, never appertains to what is simple, but in all cases only to that kind of multiplicity which, by a law of the combination of its parts, is so connected as to resist every unregulated increase, diminution, or change of its consistence, and to permit only such change as invariably leaves the new state subjected to the same law of its composition. ”

“ Of a ‘Thing,’ on the contrary, we demand a great deal more; it is required to be a subject, that can fall into states, and be affected and produce effects.
Nothing of this kind, however, appears possible as occurring in the case of a truth, which is always valid, which always is what it is, and which, since it never changes, can never pass through any experience. Every such ‘law’ is rather comprehensible by us merely as that mode of relation which flows from the inner nature of somewhat else ”

“ Metaphysic is the science of that which is actual, not of that which is merely thinkable. By actuality we distinguish a thing that is from one that is not, an event that happens from one that does not happen, a relation that exists from one that does not exist.
It is improper to apply the term ‘Being’ to this distinction; for this term, according to the customary usage of speech, designates only one kind of actuality,—namely, the motionless existence of things, in opposition, for example, to the happening of events. ”

“ Nevertheless, it is very easy to comprehend that this theory, even when most strictly carried out, can only suffice to eliminate from all external nature any change in reality itself, and to reduce it to mere variation in relations; but that, on the contrary, an actual interior changeableness must, all the more inevitably, find a place for itself in that real being for which, as for the perceiving subject, the abovementioned appearance of an objective change is assumed to originate. For in order that something may appear, a being is necessary to whom it appears. ”

“ The attempt to show as a universal law by what mechanism in ‘Becoming’ the sequence of one condition upon another could be produced, or in what way that which we call a ‘state’ could be imparted to a subject in general, would very soon teach us that these questions are just as insoluble as the question, how ‘Being’ is made. ”

“ But that the course of the world is obedient to laws,—according to which it does not merely run on of itself, but can also, within certain limits, be changed by us at will,—belongs, as an associated impression of all our experiences, so much to the sphere of our most assured knowledge, that it would be scientifically insipid to examine further a theoretical fancy which is incongruous with it. ”

“ If, however, we choose to formulate this expression exactly as follows,—‘To be’ signifies ‘to be the subject of experience,’—then this definition of ‘Being’ would by no means completely express what we actually mean by the word. For we ascribe ‘Being’ to what has been previously perceived, even when it is no longer perceived; and we consider its being perceived as only something which may possibly appertain to the thing in consequence of its unobserved, separate existence, but which is not identical with this. ”

“ The sphere of change is universally found to be limited in such a way that any a changes only into α, α1, α2, . . ., any b only into β, β1, β2; and, in general, every real being changes only into such a ‘closed series’ of forms as, taken collectively, are deducible from the original nature of the being; while no being can ever pass out of the series of its own forms over into a series of forms belonging to another being. ”

“ Now, in the next place, this conception of change, when practically and actually applied, contains twice over a certain supposition of which we have to become cognizant.
That is to say, first, when we assert that every being is developed only into such forms as can flow ‘by way of consequence’ from its own nature, and never into other forms, then we manifestly consider all the thinkable predicates, which admit of being represented as future forms of whatsoever beings, to be cohering members of a single system comprising everything thinkable ”

“ And even if we should make a world, it would remain incomprehensible why the creating force, which we must then in every case assume and can in no case further explain, would have to be subject absolutely to the limitation of positing only one element at a time. But if we suppose that this force posited the entire manifoldness of the elements of the world, as related to each other, at one time, then the whole difficulty would disappear, and all the elements would remain constant ”

“ Moreover, in the praxis of explaining the world, it is just as firmly supposed that a being a never passes into a new state α by its own agency alone, but only so far as a definite ‘condition’ X, that is different, however, from a, affects this a; so that, according to the law of identity, a in itself must, of course, always = a,—that is to say, must be unchangeable,—and, on the contrary a + X can be = α, a + Y = a1, etc. ”

“ Such a ‘reality’ would obviously be only a logical abstraction, which could never have any actuality in itself, but always only in that from which it has been abstracted.
In other words: Reality means for us the ‘Being’ of a somewhat that is capable of being affected and of producing effects. Everything with which this definition comports, is accordingly called a ‘reality,’—that is to say, has this title. ”

“ Since it is impossible to think of any efficacy as passing over from one element to another, this conception ought to be wholly abandoned, and the course of the world considered as a succession of events, each of which is only the occasion or signal for the occurrence of some other, but none of which really effectuates any other. ”

“ After it is obvious that no kind of sensible properties form the content of Things, we still do not need to resort to the desperate expedient of speaking of an existence that were absolutely devoid of content, and the entire nature of which consisted in indeterminate ‘Being,’ without any definite Somewhat to which this ‘Being’ appertains. ”

“ The above-mentioned matter will be better understood if we reflect upon the following fact, namely, that we do not assume ‘Things’ for their own sake, but in order that we may have them as subjects,—as the points of egress and of termination for ‘events’ and ‘relations’ For such a purpose a ‘Thing’ whose nature consisted merely in a simple quality posited unconditionally would be quite unsuitable. ”

“ Why should we not rather admit that a, when it passes over into α, does not remain identical, but is itself really changed. As soon as we assume that such change takes place by means of a condition X, and that the α must uniformly be transformed back again into a by means of an opposite condition - X, then we have in this form of representation all that we need in order to comprehend the actual change of things in experience. It is not necessary that a reality a remain uniformly = a, and that it assume α, α1, . ”

“ No one looks for the ‘being’ of the soul in an altogether relationless, self-sufficing ‘position’; but the soul is only so far as it lives,—that is to say, stands in manifold relations, of affection and action, to an external world.
(2) No one looks for its ‘essence’ in a ‘simple quality,’ so that the true nature of the soul would consist in this quality, while the entire manifoldness of its further development would only contain an, as it were, incidental succession of consequences, which would be wrung from this quality by circum. ”

“ For the sake of explaining the world, even the view which seeks for true ‘Being’ in ‘Position’ without relation, is still compelled to assume that things do, as a matter of fact, everywhere stand in reciprocal relations ”