Sandra Day O'Connor

“ We think it obvious that Scheiner meets the first test of nonretroactivity. Both the majority and dissent in that case recognized that the Court's decision left very little of the Aero Mayflower line of precedents standing. As the majority observed, "the precedents upholding flat taxes can no longer support the broad proposition . . . that every flat tax for the privilege of using a State's highways must be upheld even if it has a clearly discriminatory effect on commerce by reason of that commerce's interstate character." ”

“ On remand of Scheiner, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was free to consider the issue of retroactivity just as the Arkansas state court did in this case.
As the Arkansas Supreme Court has already passed on the question whether the Arkansas tax statutes are unconstitutional, that issue is not before us. Petitioners' claim here involves the second, distinct issue of the retroactivity of Scheiner. In the civil arena, we have generally considered the question of retroactivity to be a separate problem, one that need not be resolved in the law-changing decision itself. ”

“ Moreover, even a party who is deprived of the full retroactive benefit of a new decision may receive some relief. In this case, for example, petitioners are benefited by the prospective invalidation of the Arkansas tax and a ruling that Scheiner is applicable to taxation of highway use after the date of decision in that case. The criminal defendant, on the other hand, is generally interested in only one remedy: the reversal of his conviction. The prospective invalidation of a rule relied on in securing his conviction will not assist the criminal defendant in any way. ”

“ Under this new theory, any defendant whose conviction had not yet become final should be given the benefit of a new decision regardless of the additional burden this might place on law enforcement authorities.
There are no analogous reasons for adopting a per se rule of retroactivity in the civil context. Either party before a court may benefit from the application of the Chevron Oil rule. New decisions are not likely to favor civil defendants over civil plaintiffs; nor is there any policy reason for protecting one class of litigants over another. ”

“ In adopting a per se rule of retroactivity for criminal cases, Griffith relied on what, in essence, was a single justification: that it was unfair to apply different rules of criminal procedure to two defendants whose cases were pending on direct review at the same time. See id., at 322–323. In expounding this theory, the Court did not explain why the pendency of a defendant's case on direct review was the critical factor for determining the applicability of new decisions. ”

“ A contrary rule would give States a perverse incentive to collect taxes far in advance of the occurrence of the taxable transaction. It would also penalize States that do not immediately collect taxes, but nevertheless plan their operations on the assumption that they will ultimately collect taxes that have accrued. ”

“ The dissent claims that our decision today treats the petitioners in this case less favorably than the taxpayers in Scheiner, post, at 211–212, and challenges our retroactivity doctrine as fundamentally inequitable. The dissent asserts that not only does judicial integrity require the Court to apply new decisions to all cases pending on direct review, but also that we have consistently followed this practice in civil cases raising constitutional claims. Post, at 212–218. The dissent further insists that Chevron Oil does not enunciate principles of retroactivity ”

“ Where a litigant filed a claim that would have been timely under the prior limitation period, the Court has held that the new statute of limitations would not bar his suit. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 608–609 (1987) ; Chevron Oil, 404 U.S., at 107–109. ”

“ Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) ," 496 U.S., at 46, and thus the State could "hardly claim surprise at the Florida courts' invalidation of the scheme," ibid., here the State promulgated and implemented its tax scheme in reliance on the Aero Mayflower precedents of this Court. In light of these precedents, legislators would have good reason to suppose that enactment of the HUE tax would not violate their oath to uphold the United States Constitution, and the State Supreme Court would have every reason to consider itself bound by those precedents to uphold the tax against a constitutional challenge. ”

“ Effectively, HUE taxed only the first 3,500 miles of annual highway use by heavy trucks, that being the point at which it became advantageous to pay the flat tax of $175. Because trucks based in Arkansas were likely to travel many more miles on the State's highways than heavy trucks based out of the State, petitioners argued that HUE impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce by imposing on out-of-state truckers greater per-mile costs than those imposed on in-state truckers. To remedy the alleged federal constitutional violation petitioners argued that Art. ”

“ He further concluded that, because "there is a substantial risk that [petitioners] will not be able to obtain a refund if the [HUE] tax ultimately is declared unconstitutional," ibid., petitioners would suffer "irreparable injury absent injunctive relief." Ibid. Justice BLACKMUN therefore ordered Arkansas to "escrow the HUE taxes to be collected, until a final decision on the merits in this case is reached." ”

“ Nor can Arkansas be faulted for continuing to rely on its statute after its highest state court upheld the constitutionality of the tax.
In sum, we conclude that applying Scheiner retroactively would "produce substantial inequitable results." Chevron Oil, 404 U.S., at 107. The invalidation of the HUE tax has the potential for severely burdening the State's operations. That burden may be largely irrelevant when a State violates constitutional norms well established under existing precedent. See McKesson. ”

“ These precedents retain vitality only when flat taxes "are the only practicable means of collecting revenues from users," ibid. – a situation no more present in Arkansas than it was in Pennsylvania. See also id., at 298 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) (" [T] he Court today directly overrules the holdings of" the Aero Mayflower precedents) ; id., at 304 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) . That the Court in Scheiner recognized that Complete Auto Transit "called into question the future vitality of earlier cases that had upheld facially neutral flat taxes," 483 U.S., at 295, does not alter our conclusion. ”

“ See also Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 301–302 (1975) (holding that the law-changing decision should not apply where the authorization to issue securities became final prior to the date of the decision) . ”