Sandra Day O'Connor

“ There is, in sum, little that the federal courts will gain by applying a presumption of federal review in those cases where the relevant state court decision does not fairly appear to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with such law, and much that the States and state courts will lose. We decline to so expand the Harris presumption. ”

“ Where a petitioner defaults a claim as a result of the denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel, the State, which is responsible for the denial as a constitutional matter, must bear the cost of any resulting default and the harm to state interests that federal habeas review entails. A different allocation of costs is appropriate in those circumstances where the State has no responsibility to ensure that the petitioner was represented by competent counsel. ”

“ Carrier applied the cause and prejudice standard to the failure to raise a particular claim on appeal. There is no reason that the same standard should not apply to a failure to appeal at all. All of the State's interests-in channeling the resolution of claims to the most appropriate forum, in finality, and in having an opportunity to correct its own errors-are implicated whether a prisoner defaults one claim or all of them. A federal court generally should not interfere in either case. ”

“ Recognizing that " [a] bsolute equality is not required," we nonetheless held that "where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor." Id., at 357, 83 S.Ct., at 816 (emphasis original) .
Coleman has had his "one and only appeal," if that is what a state collateral proceeding may be considered; the Buchanan County Circuit Court, after a two-day evidentiary hearing, addressed Coleman's claims of trial error, including his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. ”

“ See also id., at 492, 106 S.Ct., at 2647-2648 (" [C] ause for a procedural default on appeal ordinarily requires a showing of some external impediment preventing counsel from constructing or raising the claim") .
Attorney ignorance or inadvertence is not "cause" because the attorney is the petitioner's agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must "bear the risk of attorney error." ”

“ Coleman has read the rule out of context. It is unmistakably clear that Harris applies the same presumption in habeas that Long and Caldwell adopted in direct review cases in this Court. See Harris, 489 U.S., at 263, 109 S.Ct., at 1043 ("Faced with a common problem we adopt a common solution") ; see also id., at 264, 109 S.Ct., at 1044 ("Under our decision today, a state court need do nothing more to preclude habeas review than it must do to preclude direct review") . ”

“ Prior to Long, when faced with ambiguous state court decisions, this Court had adopted various inconsistent and unsatisfactory solutions including dismissal of the case, remand to the state court for clarification, or an independent investigation of state law. ”

“ In Wainwright, we left open the question whether the deliberate bypass standard still applied to a situation like that in Fay, where a petitioner has surrendered entirely his right to appeal his state conviction. Wainwright, 433 U.S., at 88, n. 12, 97 S.Ct., at 2507, n. 12. We rejected explicitly, however, "the sweeping language of Fay v. Noia, going far beyond the facts of the case eliciting it." Id., at 87-88, 97 S.Ct., at 2507.
Our cases since Sykes have been unanimous in applying the cause and prejudice standard. Engle v. ”

“ See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886) . See also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982) ; Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989) ”