Stanley Forman Reed

“ In the field of transportation, there have been a series of decisions which hold that where Congress has not acted and although the state statute affects interstate commerce, a state may validly enact legislation which has predominantly only a local influence on the course of commerce. [16] It is equally well settled that, even where Congress has not acted, state legislation or a final court order is invalid which materially affects interstate commerce. ”

“ In weighing the factors that enter into our conclusion as to whether this statute so burdens interstate commerce or so infringes the requirements of national uniformity as to be invalid, we are mindful of the fact that conditions vary between northern or western states such as Maine or Montana, with practically no colored population; industrial states such as Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey and Pennsylvania with a small, although appreciable, percentage of colored citizens ”

“ The interferences to interstate commerce which arise from state regulation of racial association on interstate vehicles has long been recognized. Such regulation hampers freedom of choice in selecting accommodations. The recent changes in transportation brought about by the coming of automobiles does not seem of great significance in the problem. People of all races travel today more extensively than in 1878 when this Court first passed upon state regulation of racial segregation in commerce. ”

“ Changes in seat designation might be made 'at any time' during the journey when 'necessary or proper for the comfort and convenience of passengers.' This occurred in this instance. Upon such change of designation, the statute authorizes the operator of the vehicle to require, as he did here, 'any passenger to change his or her seat as it may be necessary or proper.' [23] An interstate passenger must if necessary repeatedly shift seats while moving in Virginia to meet the seating requirements of the changing passenger group. ”

“ This appeal brings to this Court the question of the constitutionality of an act of Virginia, [1] which requires all passenger motor vehicle carriers, both interstate and intrastate, [2] to separate without discrimination [3] the white and colored passengers in their otor buses so that contiguous seats will not be occupied by persons of different races at the same time. A violation of the requirement of separation by the carrier is a misdemeanor. ”

“ This does not imply the necessity for a nationally uniform regulation of arrangements for passengers on interstate carriers. Unlike other powers of Congress (see Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, concerning 'Duties, Imposts and Excises'; Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, concerning 'Naturalization'; Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, concerning 'Bankruptcies') , the power to regulate commerce does not require geographic uniformity. Congress may devise a national policy with due regard to varying interests of different regions. ”

“ Burdens upon commerce are those actions of a state which directly 'impair the usefulness of its facilities or such traffic.' [21] That impairment, we think, may arise from other causes than costs or long delays. A burden may arise from a state statute which requires interstate passengers to order their movements on the vehicle in accordance with local rather than national requirements.
On appellant's journey, this statute required that she sit in designated seats in Virginia. ”

“ This Court frequently must determine the validity of state statutes that are attacked as unconstitutional interferences with the national power over interstate commerce. This appeal presents that question as to a statute that compels racial segregation of interstate passengers in vehicles moving interstate. [12]
The precise degree of a permissible restriction on state power cannot be fixed generally or indeed not even for one kind of state legislation, such as taxation or health or safety. ”

“ The language of the other acts, like this Virginia statute before the Court of Appeals' decision in this case, may be said to be susceptible to an interpretation that they do or do not apply to interstate passengers.
In states where separation of races is required in motor vehicles, a method of identification as white or colored must be employed. This may be done by definition. Any ascertainable Negro blood identifies a person as colored for purposes of separation in some states. ”

“ Appellant's argument, properly we think, includes facts bearing on interstate motor transportation beyond those immediately involved in this journey under the Virginia statutory regulations. To appraise the weight of the burden of the Virginia statute on interstate commerce, related statutes of other states are important to show whether there are cumulative effects which may make local regulation impracticable. Eighteen states, it appears, prohibit racial separation on public carriers. [24] Ten require separation on motor carriers. ”

“ N.Y. Civil Rights Law (McKinney Consol.Laws, c. 6) , Secs. 40, 41; Ohio Code (Throckmorton) , 1940, Secs. 12940-12942; Pa.Stat. (Purdon) , Tit. 18, Secs. 4654 to 4655; R.I.Gen.Laws 1938, Ch. 606, Secs. 28, 29 ”