Supreme Court of the United States

“ Thus, the court naturally must apply the Federal Constitution rather than any statute in conflict with it. The court must also apply the state constitution over any conflicting statute enacted under a power limited by that constitution. Petitioners’ argument, however, is that legislation about the times, places, and manner of congressional elections is not limited by state constitutions—because the power to regulate those subjects comes from the Federal Constitution, not the people of the State. ”

“ State cases, debates at the Convention, and writings defending the Constitution all advanced the concept of judicial review. And in the years immediately following ratification, courts grew assured of their power to void laws incompatible with constitutional provisions. See Treanor, 58 Stan. L. Rev., at 473, 497–498. The idea that courts may review legislative action was so “long and well established” by the time we decided Marbury in 1803 that Chief Justice Marshall referred to judicial review as “one of the fundamental principles of our society.” ”

“ Hildebrant, Smiley, and Arizona State Legislature each rejected the contention that the Elections Clause vests state legislatures with exclusive and independent authority when setting the rules governing federal elections.
The argument advanced by the defendants and the dissent also does not account for the Framers’ understanding that when legislatures make laws, they are bound by the provisions of the very documents that give them life. Legislatures, the Framers recognized, “are the mere creatures of the State Constitutions, and cannot be greater than their creators.” ”

“ A state legislature is free to condition the effectiveness of a change in state law on external events, including this Court’s actions in cases properly before it. But, as should be obvious, such a trigger provision cannot be the entire basis of an Article III case or controversy. Where, as here, the Court cannot affect the adjudicated rights and liabilities of the parties in the case below, a state legislature cannot manufacture a justiciable controversy by providing that state law will change in some way depending on how this Court answers a moot question. ”

“ Courts of law simply do not render “judgments” that toggle statutes from “operative” to “inoperative” and back again, as if judicial review were some sort of in rem jurisdiction over legislative Acts. ”

“ The majority’s reasoning cannot be squared with the judicial power vested by the Constitution the case-or-controversy requirement, or the nature of judicial review.
I start by clearing away some of the brush. True, Harper III did not expressly “revisit” the Elections Clause issue, ante, at 6; true as well, petitioners did not obtain rehearing of Harper I, see ante, at 7. But none of that matters because Harper III’s final judgment mooted the Elections Clause issue in this case by dismissing plaintiffs-respondents’ claims on alternative state-law grounds. ”

“ To say that “state judicial review” authorizes applying state constitutions over conflicting Elections Clause legislation, ante, at 15, is simply to assume away petitioners’ argument.
III
The majority opinion ends with some general advice to state and lower federal courts on how to exercise “judicial review” “in cases implicating the Elections Clause.” Ante, at 28. As the majority offers no clear rationale for its interpretation of the Clause, it is impossible to be sure what the consequences of that interpretation will be. ”

“ After a Boston delegate proposed a provision regulating the manner of federal elections, Joseph Story—then a Justice of this Court—nixed the effort. In Story’s view, such a provision would run afoul of the Elections Clause by “assum [ing] a control over the Legislature, which the constitution of the United States does not justify.” Journal of the Debates and Proceedings in the Convention of Delegates 110 (1853) . But Story’s comment elicited little discussion, and reflects the views of a jurist who, although “a brilliant and accomplished man, ... was not a member of the Founding generation.” ”

“ The Court did not revisit Harper I’s conclusion that the Federal Elections Clause does not shield state legislatures from review by state courts for compliance with state constitutional provisions. ___ N. C., at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 422 (“The General Assembly exercises [redistricting] authority subject to the express limitations in our constitution and in federal law.”) . We invited the parties to submit additional supplemental briefs addressing the effect of the Court’s decision on our jurisdiction. ”

“ But the error that actually drives the majority’s conclusion is much deeper. The majority evidently thinks that when Harper I held the 2021 Act unconstitutional, it entered a “judgment” affecting the 2021 Act as a statute, independent of its application to the legal rights of the litigants in this case. And the majority thinks that to reverse Harper I’s “judgment” would “negate the force of its order striking down” the Act, thus “alter [ing] the presently operative statutes of North Carolina.” ”

“ How could petitioners still be injured, and what more could this Court possibly do for them? The majority suggests that the interlocutory injunction issued in Harper I still harms petitioners, see ante, at 7, 10–11, but that idea is untenable. To start, the majority overlooks that the injunction only ran against the conduct of defendants-respondents—the state officials who actually implement election laws—not petitioners as legislators. ”

“ Harper I has been overruled, and plaintiffs-respondents’ claims for relief have been dismissed on adequate and independent state-law grounds. As a result, petitioners’ alternative Elections Clause defense to those claims no longer requires decision; the merits of that defense simply have no bearing on the judgment between the parties in this action. That is the definition of mootness for an issue.
It follows that no live controversy remains before this Court. ”

“ This Court recently reinforced the teachings of Hildebrant and Smiley in a case considering the constitutionality of an Arizona ballot initiative. Voters “amended Arizona’s Constitution to remove redistricting authority from the Arizona Legislature and vest that authority in an independent commission.” Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U. S. 787, 792 (2015) . The Arizona Legislature challenged a congressional map adopted by the commission, arguing that the Elections “Clause precludes resort to an independent commission ... to accomplish redistricting.” ”

“ Cox Broadcasting considered our exercise of jurisdiction where the “federal issue ... will survive and require decision regardless of the outcome of future state-court proceedings.” 420 U. S., at 480. Unlike cases in which we must anticipate what the future might hold, we now know the resolution of the anticipated state court proceedings. The record shows that Harper I finally decided the Elections Clause question, the judgment in that case continues to bind the parties before us, and the 2021 congressional maps would again take effect in North Carolina were we to reverse. ”

“ Nonetheless, the majority finds that the judgment below still presents a live Article III case or controversy; it then further concludes that the question presented has survived and requires decision under Cox Broadcasting. [2] See ante, at 6–11. In doing so, it relies extensively on petitioners’ “representations” that they “remain bound by the judgment in Harper I.” Ante, at 10; see also ante, at 5, 7, 11. But, of course, parties’ mere representations that they are injured never carry their “burden of demonstrating that they have standing” in this Court. ”

“ The majority indicates that it does not perceive this distinction between “substantive” and “procedural” rules, see ante, at 23–24, [12] illustrating its doubts with a rhetorical question: “When a governor vetoes a bill because of a disagreement with its policy consequences, has the governor exercised a procedural or substantive restraint on lawmaking?” Ante, at 24. The answer is straightforward: The power of approving or vetoing bills is “a part of the legislative process” because it is “a part in the making of state laws.” Smiley, 285 U. S., at 368–369 ”

“ To say that an issue “will survive and require decision,” as Cox Broadcasting uses the phrase, simply means that it will not become moot, generally through some other issue independently resolving the case (precisely what happened here) . ”

“ Legislatures must “provide a complete code for congressional elections,” including regulations “relati [ng] to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns.” ”

“ After holding that the 2021 districting maps “substantially infringe upon plaintiffs’ fundamental right to equal voting power,” the Court struck down the maps and remanded the case to the trial “court to oversee the redrawing of the maps by the General Assembly or, if necessary, by the court.” Id., at 403, 868 S. E. 2d, at 559. The Court entered judgment on February 15, 2022. Harper v. Hall, No. 413PA21, App. to Pet. for Cert. 306–309. Two days later, the General Assembly adopted a remedial congressional redistricting plan. See 2022 N. C. Sess. Laws p. ”

“ Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U. S. 1, 8 (2013) . It also guards “against the possibility that a State would refuse to provide for the election of representatives” by authorizing Congress to prescribe its own rules. Ibid.
A
The 2020 decennial census showed that North Carolina’s population had increased by nearly one million people, entitling the State to an additional seat in its federal congressional delegation. U. S. Census Bureau, 2020 Census Apportionment Results (2021) (Table A) . ”

“ We decline to address whether the North Carolina Supreme Court strayed beyond the limits derived from the Elections Clause. The legislative defendants did not meaningfully present the issue in their petition for certiorari or in their briefing, nor did they press the matter at oral argument. See Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. ”

“ Before turning to the merits, we must “determine as a threshold matter that we have jurisdiction.” Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U. S. 174, 178 (1988) . The Constitution provides for our jurisdiction over “Cases” and “Controversies.” Art. ”