William J. Brennan, Jr.

“ And, as we have pointed out, a distinction between court enforcement and expulsion would have been anomalous for several reasons. First, Congress was operating within the context of the 'contract theory' of the union-member relationship which widely prevailed at that time. The efficacy of a contract is precisely its legal enforceability. A lawsuit is and has been the ordinary way by which performance of private money obligations is compelled. ”

“ Thus only the union may contract the employee's terms and conditions of employment, [3] and provisions for processing his grievances; the union may even bargain away his right to strike during the contract term, [4] and his right to refuse to cross a lawful picket line. [5] The employee may disagree with many of the union decisions but is bound by them. 'The majority-rule concept is today unquestionably at the center of our federal labor policy.' [6] 'The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. ”

“ That power is particularly vital when the members engage in strikes. The economic strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms, and ' (t) he power to fine or expel strikebreakers is essential if the union is to be an effective bargaining agent * * *.' [8] Provisions in union constitutions and bylaws for fines and expulsion of recalcitrants, including strikebreakers, are therefore common-place and were commonplace at the time of the Taft-Hartley amendments. ”

“ The collective bargaining agreements with the locals incorporate union security clauses. Full union membership is not compelled by the clauses: an employee is required only to become and remain 'a member of the Union * * * to the extent of payng his monthly dues * * *.' The majority en banc below nevertheless regarded full membership to be 'the result not of individual voluntary choice but of the insertion of (this) union security provision in the contract under which a substantial minority of the employees may have been forced into membership.' 358 F.2d at 660. ”

“ Union membership allows the member a part in choosing the very course of action to which he refuses to adhere, but he has of course no role in employer conduct, and nonunion employees have no voice in the affairs of the union. ”

“ Cogent support for an interpretation of the body of § 8 (b) (1) as not reaching the imposition of fines and attempts at court enforcement is the proviso to § 8 (b) (1) . It states that nothing in the section shall 'impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein * * *.' Senator Holland offered the proviso during debate and Senator Ball immediately accepted it, stating that it was not the intent of the sponsors in any way to regulate the internal affairs of unions. ”

“ Second, as we have noted, such a distinction would visit upon the member of a strong union a potentially more severe punishment than court enforcement of fines, while impairing the bargaining facility of the weak union by requiring it either to condone misconduct or deplete its ranks.
There may be concern that court enforcement may permit the collection of unreasonably large fines. [30] However, even were there evidence that Congress shared this concern, [31] this would not justify reading the Act also to bar court enforcement of reasonable fines. ”

“ Senator Taft also initially confined his comments on the amendment to examples of organizational tactics. [20] However, in debate with Senator Pepper, he suggested a broader but still limited application:
'If there is anything clear in the development of labor union history in the past 10 years it is that more and more labor union employees have come to be subject to the orders of labor union leaders. The bill provides for the right to protest against arbitrary powers which have been exercised by some of the labor union leaders.' [21] (Emphasis supplied.) ”

“ It is true that there are references in the Senate debate on § 8 (b) (1) (A) to an intent to impose the same prohibitions on unions that applied to employers as regards restraint and coercion of employees in their exercise of § 7 rights. [26] However apposite this parallel might be when applied to organizational tactics, it clearly is inapplicable to the relationship of a union member to his own union. ”

“ On its face court enforcement of fines imposed on members for violation of membership obligations is no more conduct to 'restrain or coerce' satisfaction of such obligations than court enforcement of penalties imposed on citizens for violation of their obligations as citizens to pay income taxes, or court awards of damages against a contracting party for nonperformance of a contractual obligation voluntarily undertaken. ”

“ Upon Allis-Chalmers' petition for review to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, a panel of that court upheld the Board's decision. Following a rehearing en banc, however, the court, three judges dissenting, withdrew the panel opinion, held that the locals' conduct violated § 8 (b) (1) (A) , and remanded to the Board for appropriate proceedings. ”

“ A wide rng e of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.' Ford Motor Co. ”