William O. Douglas

“ Even assuming, as the State does, and as the Court is persuaded, that a court of equity could be called upon to enjoin a conspiracy to establish rates in anticipation of a determination of their unlawfulness, it would plainly be impossible to frame a decree for relief in advance of a determination by the Commission that the present rates are unlawful, or that those resulting from the decree would be lawful. Courts cannot enjoin, in general terms, violations of the Sherman Act, without specifying what acts are to be enjoined as violations, or as aiding or inducing violations. ”

“ This verbal maneuver, as a means of conferring jurisdiction on this Court, is futile, for the reason, as we have said, that the State cannot maintain its suit in equity either under § 16 of the Clayton Act or upon general equity principles, without establishing a threatened injury to it or those whom it represents. And this is equally true whether it sues as parens patriae or as owner of a railroad, and a shipper and consignee of freight. The threatened injury can ensue only from the maintenance of the unlawful rates and practices, which are specially charged to be discriminatory. ”

“ But the inhabitants of the State who have suffered injury or who are threatened with injury by the unlawful practices alleged in the amended complaint are alone entitled to seek a legal remedy for their injury, and are the proper parties plaintiff in any suit to enforce their rights which are alleged to have been infringed. It has long been settled by the decisions of this Court that a State is without standing to maintain suit for injuries sustained by its citizens and inhabitants for which they may sue in their own behalf. ”

“ The Government is charged with the enforcement of the antitrust laws, and is authorized by § 4 of the Sherman Act and § 16 of the Clayton Act to maintain suits for that purpose, which others cannot bring. If it believes that the alleged conspiracy exists and should be stopped by the remedial action of courts, without resort to the Commission, there would seem to be no reason why, avoiding the many technical obstacles to the present suit, it should not proceed to remedy in the usual manner the grievances of the citizens of the United States including citizens of Georgia. ”

“ It is sufficient here to note that we find no warrant in the Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Act for saying that the authority to fix joint through rates clothes with legality a conspiracy to discriminate against a State or a region, to use coercion in the fixing of rates, or to put in the hands of a combination of carriers a veto power over rates proposed by a single carrier. The type of regulation which Congress chose did not eliminate the emphasis on competition and individual freedom of action in rate making. ”

“ The amended complaint alleges that 'The wrong done transcends that experienced by individuals. For as men, firms, and corporations have come and gone, the conspiracy has continued over the decades.' While trial upon the original complaint might have reduced this grievance to the dimensions of a cause of action to enjoin illegal freight rates injurious to the State, it now appears as the grievance of a section of the country against an existing federal system of rate making which should be addressed to Congress rather than to this Court. ”

“ The Court construed the Act of Congress as subjecting the rates to federal control until the territory became a part of a State, at which time the rates became subject to state control. The Court held that our original jurisdiction could not be invoked by a State merely because its citizens were injured. We adhere to that decision. It does not control the present one. ”

“ The authority to bring such suits includes the discretionary authority not to bring them, if the responsible officers of the government are of the opinion that a suit is not warranted or would be of disservice to the national interest. To permit a State to bring a Sherman Act suit in behalf of the public is to fly in the face of the national policy established by Congress that the federal government should determine when such a suit is to be brought and how it should be prosecuted. ”

“ Georgia is seeking a decree which will prevent in the future the kind of harmful conduct which has occurred in the past. Take the case of coercion. If it is shown that the alleged combination exists and uses coercion in the fixing of joint through rates, only an injunction aimed at future conduct of that character can give adequate relief. Indeed, so long as the collaboration which exists exceeds lawful limits and continues in operation, the only effective remedy lies in dissolving the combination or in confining it within legitimate boundaries. ”

“ It is, as we have said, a familiar principle governing the exercise of equity jurisdiction of federal courts that equitable relief may be invoked only when the plaintiff is without other adequate remedy. ”

“ The complaint alleges a conspiracy to restrain trade and commerce through the fixing of rates. The history of restraints of trade makes it plain that these problems present judicial questions with which courts have long dealt. [2]
It is of course true that Georgia does not have a right to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Court merely because there may be involved a judicial question. It is not enough that a State is plaintiff. The original jurisdiction is confined to civil suits where damage has been inflicted or is threatened not to the enforcement of penal statutes of a State. ”

“ The fact that a State may constitutionally invoke the jurisdiction of this Court in a suit brought by it against citizens of another State, does not dispense with the further requisite that if equitable relief is sought, the bill of complaint must state a cause of action cognizable in equity, of such a nature that the Court can give relief. ”

“ The essence of the complaint is a charge of a conspiracy among the defendants in restraint of trade and commerce among the States. It alleges that they have fixed arbitrary and noncompetitive rates and charges for transportation of freight by railroad to and from Georgia so as to prefer the ports of other States over the ports of Georgia. It charges that some sixty rate bureaus, committees, conferences, associations and other private rate-fixing agencies have been utilized by defendants to fix these rates ”

“ Prejudice and discrimination would be created as to every other State in southern territory and as to shippers and consignees of freight in those States who would still be governed by the published tariff rates, against which only Georgia and its citizens would have secured some measure of relief. ”

“ And it added: 'This stringent rule prevails, because otherwise the paramount purpose of Congress-prevention of unjust discrimination-might be defeated. If a shipper could recover under section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act for damages resulting from the exaction of a rate higher than that which would otherwise have prevailed, the amount recovered might, like a rebate, operate to give him a preference over his trade competitors.' 260 U.S. at page 163, 43 S.Ct. ”

“ And, as we shall develop more fully when we turn to a consideration of the assertion that no cause of action has been stated, we are not asked to resolve a dispute which has been withdrawn from the judiciary or which by the charter of our government has been reposed in departments other than the judiciary. ”

“ Further, it may be readily determined from standard works of reference, such as The Official Guide of the Railways, Moody's Steam Railroads, railroad time-tables, and telephone directories, that the supposed difficulty is not a real one. Under § 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22, 15 U.S.C.A. § 22, these defendants may be sued in any district in which they are 'found' or 'transact business.' A corporation both is 'found' and 'transacts business' in a district in which it operates a railroad or in which it maintains an office for the solicitation of freight or passenger traffic. ”

“ But Georgia is not confined to suits designed to protect only her proprietary interests. The rights which Georgia asserts, parens patriae, are those arising from an alleged conspiracy of private persons whose price-fixing scheme, it is said, has injured the economy of Georgia. Those rights are of course based on federal laws. The enforcement of the criminal sanctions of these acts has been entrusted exclusively to the federal government. See State of Georgia v. ”

“ They may arrest the development of a State or put it at a decided disadvantage in competitive markets. Such a charge at least equals in gravity the one which Pennsylvania and Ohio had with West Virginia over the curtailment of the flow of natural gas from the West Virginia fields. ”

“ Each sues to protect a twofold interest-one as the proprietor of various public institutions and schools whose supply of gas will be largely curtailed or cut off by the threatened interference with the interstate current, and the other as the representative of the consuming public whose supply will be similarly affected. ”

“ But Congress has not given the Commission comparable authority to remove rate-fixing combinations from the prohibitions contained in the anti-trust laws. It has not placed these combinations under the control and supervision of the Commission. Nor has it empowered the Commission to proceed against such combinations and through cease and desist orders or otherwise to put an end to their activities. Regulated industries are not per se exempt from the Sherman Act. ”

“ The collaboration contemplated in the fixing of through and joint rates is of a restrictive nature. We do not stop at this stage of the proceedings to delineate the legitimate area in which that collaboration may operate. In the Keogh case, 260 U.S. 156, 43 S.Ct. 47, 67 L.Ed. 183, the suit was one for damages under the Sherman Act. The charge was that the defendant carriers had formed a rate bureau or committee to secure agreement in respect to freight rates among the constituent railroad companies which would otherwise be competing carriers. ”

“ The Commission is directed to consider the effect of rates on the movement of traffic, and the need of adequate and efficient railway transportation service at low cost, as well as the carriers' need of revenues sufficient to enable them to provide that service. Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, § 15a, 49 U.S.C. § 15a, 49 U.S.C.A. § 15a. In fixing rates or divisions, the Commission's determination may take account of the financial needs of the weaker carriers, by giving them a larger share of divisions, or by a general rate increase. ”

“ Since illegality in existing rates is averred because of disparity in the level of rates in two rate making areas, with no allegation that southern carriers receive more than a fair charge for their transportation service, the Court would be required to determine whether the discrimination should be removed by increasing rates in official territory or establishing an intermediate level of new rates, Interstate Commerce Commission v. ”