Clarence Thomas

“ In this case, the majority has concluded from silence that Congress believed state lawsuits pose no obstacle to federal drug approval objectives. See ante, at 574–575. That is the required conclusion, but only because it is compelled by the text of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions, not judicial suppositions about Congress' unstated goals. The fact that the Court reaches the proper conclusion does not justify its speculation about the reasons for congressional inaction. ”

“ Furthermore, the dissent observed that "by definition all of the standards established under the Safety Act . . . impose minimum, rather than fixed or maximum, requirements." 529 U.S., at 903 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1391 (2) ) . Thus, in the dissent's view, the requirements of the DOT regulation were not ceilings, and it was "obvious that the Secretary favored a more rapid increase" than required by the regulations. 529 U.S., at 903. That goal also would be consistent with a state-law judgment finding that a manufacturer acted negligently when it failed to include an airbag in a particular car. ”

“ Under the Supremacy Clause, state law is pre-empted only by federal law "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2 – not by extratextual considerations of the purposes underlying congressional inaction. See Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 104 (1989) (plurality opinion) (finding that policy arguments that "are not based in the text of the statute . . . [p604] are not helpful") ”

“ Nonexempt aliens who fail to register are subject to a fine or imprisonment For failure to carry an identification card or for failure to show it upon proper demand, the punishment is a fine, or imprisonment . . . ." Hines, 312 U.S., at 59–60 (footnote omitted) . The Court explained that the federal Alien Registration Act required: "a single registration of aliens 14 years of age and over; detailed information specified by the Act, plus 'such additional matters as may be pre scribed by the Commissioner, with the approval of the Attorney General' ”

“ For example, the majority relies heavily on Congress' failure "during the . . . 70-year history" of the federal Food, Drug, and Cos metic Act to enact an express pre-emption provision that addresses approval of a drug label by the FDA. Ante, at 574. That "silence on the issue, coupled with [Congress'] certain awareness of the prevalence of state tort litigation," the majority reasons, is evidence that Congress did not intend for federal approval of drug labels to pre-empt state tort judgments. ”

“ To do so, the Court looked in part to public sentiment, noting that " [o] pposition to laws . . . singling out aliens as particularly dangerous and undesirable groups, is deep-seated in this country." Ibid. The Court also relied on statements by particular Members of Congress and on congressional inaction, finding it pertinent that numerous bills with requirements similar to Pennsylvania's law had failed to garner enough votes in Congress to become law. ”

“ Atascadero State Hospital, supra, at 242, to "reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front," because a "federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous advantages," such as "a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society" and "increase [d] opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes," Gregory, supra, at 458. ”

“ In particular, the majority found that DOT intended to "deliberately provid [e] the manufacturer [s] with a range of choices among different passive restraint devices" and to "bring about a mix of different devices introduced gradually over time," based on comments that DOT made when prom ulgating its regulation, rather than the Safety Act's text. ”

“ The majority also embarked on a judicial inquiry into "why and how DOT sought these objectives," ibid., by considering regulatory history and the Government's brief, which described DOT's safety standard as "'embod [ying] the Secretary's policy judgment that safety would best be pro moted if manufacturers installed alternative protection sys tems in their fleets rather than one particular system in every car,'" id., at 881 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., O.T. 1999, No. 98–1811, p. 25) ”