Summary

G. A. Johnston An Introduction to Ethics, for Training Colleges… (1915)

If we take deliberate and purposeful actions such as Joffre's and the deceitful girl's, in which, as we have seen, there is both a definite end and a system of feelings, can we say that the rightness of the action depends solely on the feelings? Was Joffre's action right merely because he loved his country? Was the girl's deception wrong, simply because she felt jealous of her rival? It would be absurd to believe that. The rightness and wrongness of actions depends not on the feeling alone, but on the feeling plus the end that is purposed. And both of these are included in the motive.
Source: Wikisource

G. A. Johnston An Introduction to Ethics, for Training Colleges… (1915)

If a man does an action, merely because some external sanction advises it, his action is not really moral at all. It has no moral motive. The reasons given by the sanctions why certain actions should be done and others avoided are not really moral at all. Now the justification of a moral act must always itself be moral. It will not do to attempt to justify a moral action by referring to some physical pain or pleasure, that will attend its avoidance or performance. Nor can moral actions be sanctioned by pointing to the legal, social, and religious consequences of them.
Source: Wikisource

G. A. Johnston An Introduction to Ethics, for Training Colleges… (1915)

The sanctions of morality, as we have seen, are attempts to answer the question, "Why should I be good?" And we have also seen that no sanction can give a satisfactory answer to this question. The only sound answer to the question, "Why should I be good?" is, "Because it is good to be good." Good conduct is its own sufficient justification.
Source: Wikisource

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